Tag Archives: Case Summary

4th National Case Comment Writing Competition Organised by Team Attorneylex: Register by 20th August 

About the Organisation:

Team Attorneylex is a Student-run organisation, it is an online platform for law students where they can contribute their legal knowledge and get recognized for their contribution. 

Along with the other activities the endeavour is to deliver legal help to the sectors of society that are unable to access existing legal services due to illiteracy and poor economic conditions.

About the Competition:

The objective of this competition is to promote the importance of the latest landmark judgment passed by the Supreme Court of India. This competition will enable the participants to know how these latest judgments have changed the overall course of justice. The Supreme Court landmark judgments provided as the theme of the Competition would not only enrich the academic experience but also provide knowledge about the practical aspect of the professional legal world. This Case Comment Writing Competition seeks to promote original thoughts, and analysis amongst students, researchers, academicians and legal practitioners.

 Eligibility Criteria:

  • Open to All.
  • All undergraduate and postgraduate students, teachers, research scholars from a recognized school, college or university are eligible to participate in this competition.

List of Cases for Case Comment Writing ( Choose any one)

  1. Aruna Ramachandra Shanbaug v. Union of India (2011) [Passive euthanasia]
  2. Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2013) (Struck down as unconstitutional Section 8(4) of RPA,1951)
  3. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, 1985  (fundamental right cannot be waived)
  4. State of Karnataka v. State of Tamil Nadu [Cauvery Dispute]
  5. Durga Prasad v. Baldeo and others [(1881) ILR3ALL221] 
  6. Sri Gopal Jalan & Co. v. Calcutta Stock Exchange Association Ltd [1964 AIR 250, 1964 SCR (3) 698]
  7. Dheeraj Mor v. Hon’ble High Court of Delhi [Judicial Services 2020]
  8. Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police, [2020 SCC OnLine SC 808] ( Shaheen Bagh Protests)
  9. Bajaj Electricals Limited vs. Gourav Bajaj & Anr (Patent Law)
  10. Dr. Shah Faesal & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [2020 4 SCC 1] ( Article 370 )
  11. Pandurang Ganpati v. Vishwasrao Patil Murgud Sahakari Bank Ltd [2020 SCC OnLine SC 431] (SARFAESI Act )
  12. Chebrolu Leela Prasad Rao & Ors. v.State of A.P. & Ors. [2020 SCC OnLine SC 383] (100% reservation for tribal teachers)
  13. Swapnil Tripathi & Ors. v. Supreme Court of India & Ors. [Verdict on Live-streaming Apex Court Proceeding]
  14. Novartis vs. Union of India [CIVIL APPEAL No. 2706-2716 OF 2013 (ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) Nos. 20539-20549 OF 2009] (Patent Law)
  15. Bayer Corporation vs. Union of India [162(2009) DLT 371] 
  16. New India Assurance v. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd. [2020 SCC OnLine SC 287] ( Consumer Forum has no jurisdiction to extend time beyond 45 days for opposite party’s version)
  17. Independent Though v. Union of India and Anr. (2017) 10 SCC 800
  18. Mukesh & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. (2017) 6 SCC 1
  19. Supreme Court Advocates-on Record Association v. Union of India, 2014 (NJAC was held unconstitutional)
  20. State vs. Ram Singh and another SC No. 114/2013 (Nirbhaya Case)

Submission Guidelines:

  • The case comment should preferably include the following elements: Synopsis, background, facts of the case, issues, contentions, findings, reasoning, disposition, critical analysis, conclusion.
  • The submission must be original. 
  • Submission must be in English Language only.
  • It should be submitted in Word/ Docs document format only.
  • Word Limit: 1200-2400 words excluding citations.
  • Plagiarism limit: 25%. 
  • Co-authorship is permitted( Max. 2 Authors)
  • Formatting Details:
  1. Font: Times New Roman
  2. Title: Font Size – 14, Bold, Underlined, Capital
  3. Headings: Font Size – 14, Bold, Capital
  4. Content: Font Size – 12
  5. Alignment: Justified
  6. Line Spacing: 1.5
  7. Citation: Endnote (20th Blue Book)

Note: The submission shall also be accompanied by another Word document consisting of a Cover Letter mentioning the Name of the Author/s; Name of the Institution/College/University; Designation; Year of Study (if applicable); Email ID.

Marks Shall be allotted based on:

  1. Understanding of the Facts of the Case (Topic chosen)
  2. Interpretation
  3. Analysis and Conclusion
  4. Presentation and Creativity
  5. Compliance & Strict Adherence to formatting and submission guidelines

Important Dates and Timing: 

  1. Last Date of Registration: 20 August 2021
  2. Last Date of Submission: 21 August 2021, 11:59 PM.
  3. Declaration of Results: 25 August 2021

Prizes:

  • Winner: Cash prize Rs. 2000/- + Certificate of Merit + Free Article/ Case Summary publication on the website + Online Internship opportunity with the Team Attorneylex.
  • Runner up: Cash prize Rs. 1000/- + Certificate of Merit + Free Article/ Case Summary publication on the website  + Online Internship Opportunity with Team Attorneylex.
  • 2nd Runner Up: Cash prize Rs. 500/- + Certificate of Merit + Free Article/ Case Summary publication on the website + Online Internship Opportunity with Team Attorneylex.
  • Top 20 Performers: Certificate of Merit + Free Article/ Case Summary publication on the website + Online Internship Opportunity with Team Attorneylex.
  • E – participation Certificate will be provided to all the participants.

Registration Fee:

Single Author: Rs. 60/- (Early bird offer Rs. 50, till 10th August)

Two Authors: Rs. 100/- (Early bird offer Rs. 90, till 10th August)

Payments details

Paytm/ G-pay/Phonepe- 9616696008 (Gaurav yadav)

Bhim UPI- 9616696008@upi

Bank details-

Name- Gaurav Yadav

Bank – HDFC Bank

Account Number- 50100429858721

IFSC Code- HDFC0009157

Registration Link

Click here to register,

Or 

https://forms.gle/3vyBM3AsWiADF2iE9

Website Link

https://teamattorneylex.in/

If you have any queries feel free to contact

Vanshika – 07055460463

Gaurav – 09616696008

Email- contact@teamattorneylex.in

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION ORS. V. THE STATE OF KERALA ORS

This Case Summary is written by Lavanya Ajaykumar Panicker, a student at DY Patil Deemed To Be University School of Law, Nerul, Navi Mumbai

SYNOPSIS

“A woman with a voice is by definition a strong woman. But the search to find that voice can be remarkably difficult.”

  • Melinda Gates

The Indian Young Lawyers Association brought the case to the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in 2006 as a public interest lawsuit (PIL). The case focuses on a crucial issue: women’s entry into the Sabarimala Temple. There were several concerns presented, with petitioners arguing that laws restricting women’s access to temples are illegal because they violate Article 14, Article 15, Article 17, Article 25, and Article 26 of the Indian Constitution. The divine Sabarimala Temple is positioned in the Periyar Tiger Reserve in Kerala’s Pathanamthitta District, in the western ghat mountain ranges. Lord Ayyappa is well-known in this temple. It states that it is a place of worship and prohibits women of menstruating age who are between the ages of 10 and 50 from entering. The constitutional bench, which included former Chief Justice J. Dipak Mishra, J. A. M. Khanwilkar, J. Chandrachud, J. R. F. Nariman, and J. Indu Malhotra, delivered the verdict on September 26, 2018, with a 4:1 plurality, with the solitary dissenting opinion coming from J. Indu Malhotra, the bench’s only lady judge.

BACKGROUND

For Hindus, the holy Sabrimala Temple is one of the most well-known pilgrimages and worship sites. Women were prohibited from entering the temple because it was thought that Lord Ayyappa was a Naishtika Brahmachari” and because women of menstruating age are not innocent in that section and would encroach on the idol’s celibacy. S Mahendra filed a petition in 1990, charging that young people were flocking to Sabarimala Temple. Justice K. Paripoornan and K. Srinivasan delivered the same judgement in 1991. The Kerala High Court’s Balanarayana Marar ruled that women between the ages of 10 and 50 are prohibited from offering worship at Sabarimala Temple, adding that the prohibition is not new, but has been in place for a long time. The Sabarimala Temple would be one of Hinduism’s most well-known pilgrimage sites. Women of menstruating age were barred from entering the Sabarimala shrine, which is one of Kerala’s most prominent temples. Several women attempted to join the temple but were denied due to threats of sexual attack.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Women have long fought for equal status and inclusion in public places in our society. However, the situation is improving, and numerous changes have been enacted as a result of court decisions. The Supreme Court has secured Muslim women’s rights from triple talaq, as it did in the Mohd. Ahmed Khan vs Shah Bano Begum And Ors. The Supreme Court has allowed women to enter Haji Ali Dargah in the case of Dr. Noorjehan Safia Niaz And 1 Anr vs State Of Maharashtra And Ors. For a long time, the question of prohibitions on women between the ages of 10 and 50 entering Sabarimala temple has been a source of national discussion. With the Supreme Court’s decision, this topic has regained national prominence. Some scholars say Ayyappa is the Buddhist Purana’s Nilakantha Avalokiteswara. M brought up this point. In her chapter on ‘Introduction to Kerala Studies,’ Sreekala Nair. The appearance of Vavar (a Muslim deity) in the temple grounds is another special feature. The Sabarimala pilgrims visit Arthunkal church, where they retrieve their’ malas,’ indicating some Christian presence. The Sabarimala space witnesses a transformation into the Brahmanic fold of Hinduism, particularly in the twentieth century, from this heterogeneous identity. Sabarimala is said to depict “Naishtika Brahamcharya,” a perpetual brahamcharya and a celibate student who gains great powers from his ascetic endeavours, especially abstention from sexual activities, which he practised before and after becoming a brahamcharya. going to Sabarimala for a pilgrimage as a result, according to a notice sent by the temple’s management board, women of menstruating age are not allowed to join the temple.

ISSUES RAISED

Below stated are the issues stated in Indian Young Lawyers Association & Ors. V. The State of Kerala & Ors are mentioned in brief: 

  1. Whether the exclusionary practice against the female gender amounts to “discrimination”? Whether the same leads to violation of Articles 14, 15, and 17?
  2. Reinterpretation of “essential religious practice” under Article 25. Whether a religious institution assert a claim on the right to manage its own affairs in the matters of religion?
  3. Whether Ayyappa Temple has a denominational character? Whether it is hit by Article 290-A of the Constitution of India or not?
  4. Whether Rule 3 of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules permits ‘religious denomination’ to ban entry of women between the age of 10 to 50 years?
  5. Whether Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules, 1965 is ultra vires the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965 and, if treated to be intra vires, whether it will be violative of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution?

CONTENTIONS

The Sabarimala decision exemplifies the issue of how often customs should circumvent rules. In the case of S., the Kerala High Court made the decision in 1991. Similar arguments were made in Mahendran v. The Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board, Thiruvananthpuram, and Ors. In 2017, a three-judge panel was formed to investigate the Sabarimala case. This bench looked into the reasons given by the Kerela government to explain the ban. They have looked at why the Kerala High Court approved the government’s opposing position in 1991. The Kerala High Court explained its decision by stating that it was clearly respecting religious and historical values

FINDINGS AND REASONING

After the High Court barred women aged 10 to 50 from entering the country in 1991, a later petition submitted in 2006 sparked heated debate. Menstruation is not impure, and women should have free access to temples, it was argued in their favour. It is gender inequality to consider women impure when they menstruate. Pinarayi Vijayan, the Chief Minister of Kerala, stated that his party has always advocated gender equality and that women are provided with facilities and security. This activity also violates Article 14 of the Indian Constitution (Equality before Law), as discrimination based on a certain age demographic of women is not permissible.

The case was decided on a 4:1 basis, which found that the exclusion of women from the Sabarimala shrine is illegal, as is section 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Worship (Authorization of Entry) Act 1965.

This limitation is in violation of the Indian Constitution’s Articles 15, 25, and 26:

  1. Article 15 prohibits discrimination based on religion, ethnicity, caste, sex, or place of birth. This activity is in violation of Article 15 because segregation based on “sex” was used to gain access to the temple.
  2. “Freedom of faith and free profession, promotion, and traditions of religion” are the topics of Article 25. This activity is a violation of Article 25 since it denies women the right to practise their faith freely.
  3. The “freedom to control religious affairs” is addressed in Article 26. This activity is obviously in violation of Article 26 in this case.

The devotees’ prediction is false, since the Ayyappans cannot be classified as a religious denomination because they do not meet the criteria. Article 26’s universal right is given to religious denominations or parts of them, not to people. This religion can be defined by people who have a similar religion, have a common organisation, and are identified as a section by a distinct name. It is important to differentiate between religious believers and denominational worshippers.

  1. The clauses of the Kerala Hindu Place of Public Worship Act, 1965, restricting women’s access to temples, are unconstitutional because they violate Indian Constitution Articles 14, 15, 25, and 26.

The applicant/intervenor in Deepak Sibal & Ors vs Punjab University And Another and others 12 argued that the exclusionary procedure contradicts the enshrined in the constitution principle of dignity of women and equality before the law, and that the burden of demonstrating that it does not violate is on respondent no. 2, the Devaswom Board, which the aforementioned respondent has failed to discharge.

The applicant/intervenor further claims that the exclusionary activity in and of itself violates Article 15(1) of the Constitution, since it amounts to sex discrimination because menstruation is a bodily function that is exclusive to women. The applicant/intervenor has relied on this Court’s decisions in Anuj Garg & Ors vs Hotel Association Of India & Ors to support his/her position. To emphasise that gender inequality in some manner is contrary to constitutional norms, see India and others14 and Charu Khurana and others v. Union of India and others.

DISPOSITION

On September 28, 2018, the Court handed down its decision in this case, ruling by a 4:1 consensus that the women’s ban in Sabarimala Temple is discriminatory. It ruled that the practise infringed on Articles 14, 15, 19(1), 21, and 25 of the Constitution, which guarantee dignity, liberty, and religious freedom (1). The Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship Act’s Rule 3(b) was declared unconstitutional. If the exclusion was based on “law,” Rule 3(b) permitted Hindu denominations to keep women out of public houses of worship.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court’s five-judge panel that heard the case and handed down its decision argued differently and held differing viewpoints. A dissenting opinion was written by Justice Indu Malhotra on the subject. The petitioners and respondents each made some cases before the Supreme Court. The petitioners argued that the temple authorities’ restriction of women’s access to the temple is plainly unconstitutional and in violation of their constitutional rights guaranteed by the Indian Constitution. Exclusion based on biological, morphological properties such as menstruation is arbitrary and unfair, according to Chief Justice Dipak Mishra and Justice Khanwilkar. Both men and women have the freedom to worship, and the temple administrators’ custom was patriarchal and in violation of the Indian Constitution. Any religious belief or tradition that offended women’s integrity by refusing them admission simply because they menstruate was unconstitutional, according to Justice Chandrachud. “The taboo of menstruation has been built up around cultural values in the impurity of menstruating women,” the judge said. They have no room in the legal system. A woman’s menstrual status cannot be seen as a legal statutory justification for depriving her of her dignity and autonomy as a person.

CONCLUSION

“We do not need magic to transform our world. We carry all the power we need inside ourselves already. We have the power to imagine better” — J. K. Rowling

Women have been discriminated against not only because of biological causes, but also because of the Hindu religion’s orthodox ill practises. All people of India have non-discriminatory rights under the Indian constitution, regardless of their rank, age, sex, caste, religion, gender, or other factors. On the basis of the fair assignment interpretation theory, only affirmative discrimination is permitted. In this situation, judicial activism has played a significant part. The Indian judiciary has once again shown its open judicial mind, demonstrating that the mechanical and blind enforcement of archaic legislation leads to unjust acts and prohibitions. The legislature must now ensure that religious traditions and civil rights do not conflict in an unfair way. Any such debate must be resolved by theological amendments. The presence of other bramacharya deities and their temples all over India is another counter-argument to this issue. Lord Hanuman, for example, was a Brahamchari, but women are allowed to enter Hanuman’s temples. Hence, In the road to understanding divinity, it is often observed that women are viewed unequally.

NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR V. UNION OF INDIA [WP (CRIMINAL) NO. 76 OF 2016]- [SEC. 377 VERDICT]

This Case Summary is written by YAZHINI B, a student at School of Excellence in Law

SYNOPSIS:

  • The rights of homosexual persons were dealt with in this historic case, which sought to decriminalize private homosexual relations and to declare Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code to be unconstitutional as it was in violation of Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 of the Constitution.
  • Section 377 of the IPC was struck down on September 2018 by a Five judge bench to the extent of criminalising homosexual relations between consenting adults, but the provisions of Section 377 will continue to govern  non-consensual sexual acts against adults and all acts of carnal intercourse against minors and the acts of bestiality

BACKGROUND:

  • Section 377 of the Indian penal code punishes those who voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the “order of nature”.  This rule was introduced in the British-India era and modelled on the Buggery Act of 1533.
  • Even before this famous case that dealt with the rights of homosexuals, some cases dealt with the constitutional validity of Section 377 of IPC and recognizing the identity of transgender.
  • Naz Foundation Vs Government Of Nct Of Delhi, July 2009:

A public interest litigation was filed before the Delhi High Court by Naz Foundation India Trust challenging the constitutionality of Section 377 under Articles 14,15,19, and 21. The court held that targeting homosexuals contravenes the equal protection guaranteed under Article 14. Since the term ‘Sex’ in Article 15 includes ‘Sexual orientation’ also, discrimination based on sexual orientation is in Violation of Article 15 and hence Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be used to punish consensual adults having sexual relationships since it is in violation with the right to privacy and liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the constitution.

  • After the decision made in this aforementioned case, numerous organizations and individuals challenged the judgement. In the case of Suresh Kumar Koushal & Anr vs Naz Foundation, the supreme court reversed the judgement made by the Delhi high court. It held Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code to be constitutionally valid since the section punishes only certain acts and not any particular class of people; hence, there was no discrimination.
  • Many curative petitions were filed against the Supreme Court judgement made in the Suresh Kumar Koshal case. 

FACTS OF THE CASE:

  • A Writ Petition was filed by Navtej Singh Johar and 4 other members of the LGBTQ community for scrapping Section 377 IPC in so far as it criminalised consensual sex between homosexual individuals.
  • The petitioner highlighted that criminalizing the consensual relationship between same-sex adults creates an inferior perception of them by society, thereby affecting their everyday lives and chances of employment.
  • The petitioners invoked Equality, right to privacy, right to sexuality and sexual anatomy and discrimination against a particular class of people against Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code 
  • After hearing the plea, the Supreme Court held that using Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code to victimize homosexuals was unconstitutional, stating that the relationship between consenting adults cannot be a crime, and the court partially struck down the section in its decision.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Section 377 of the Indian penal code violates the right to autonomy and dignity under Article 21 by penalizing personal consensual acts between same-sex individuals?

2. Whether Section 377 of the Indian penal code violates Articles 14 and 15 by allowing discrimination based on sexual orientation?

3. Whether Section 377 of the Indian penal code violates Article 19(1)(a) by criminalizing the gender and sexual expression of persons belonging to the LGBTQ community?

4. Whether Section 377 of the Indian penal code contradicts to the judgement given in the case of Suresh Kumar Kaushal & Anr. Vs. Naz Foundation & Ors?

PETITIONERS CONTENTIONS:

The key arguments placed by the petitioners are,

  • Penalizing same-sex relations under Section 377 of the Indian penal code affects the rights of the LGBTQ community in various aspects of their life and also creates an inferior perception of them in society.
  • Having a consensual relationship with same-sex adults is not “against the order of nature” but a natural feeling that is innate.
  • Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code discriminates against a particular class of people, and hence it is in violation of Article 14 of the Indian Constitution
  • They highlighted the recognition of sexual orientation and gender identity in the “NALSA” judgment.
  • Sexual autonomy and the right to choose a partner of one’s choice is inherent under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution
  • They contended that Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code is arbitrary and should be struck down by quoting the “Shayara Bano vs Union of India ” case.
  • They made submissions to the fact that Article 15 provides protection against discrimination on the ground of sex which includes sexual orientation.
  • They argued that Section 377 violates the ability of the LGBTQ community to express themselves openly under Article 19(1)(a)of the Indian Constitution.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTIONS:

The key arguments placed by the respondents are,

  • Individuals indulging in homosexual activities are more likely to contract HIV, increasing the percentage of AIDS victims in the country.
  • Only the sexual acts which result in reproduction would constitute the order of nature, and the homosexual relationship is against the order of nature.
  • Section 377 of the IPC is not violating Article 15 since it prohibits discrimination based on sex but not on sexual orientation.
  • Section 377 of IPC does not violate Article 14 since the section targets and punishes only a certain act, not a certain class.

DISPOSITION:

  • The Court delivered its verdict on 6th September 2018. The five-judge Bench partially struck down Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code to the extent of criminalising homosexual relations between consenting adults, and the provisions of Section 377 will continue to govern non-consensual sexual acts against adults and all acts of carnal intercourse against minors and the acts of bestiality

ANALYSIS:

  • The five-judge bench overruled the decision made in the Suresh Kumar Koshal case. It held that choice of whom to partner and the ability to find fulfilment in sexual intimacies. The right not to be subjected to discriminatory behaviour is intrinsic to the constitutional protection of sexual orientation.
  • Justice Indu Malhotra emphasised that gender identity and sexual orientation is integral to one’s personality and are a basic aspect of self-determination, dignity and freedom quoting K.S. Puttaswamy & Anr. v. Union of India. She stressed that Section 377 criminalizing “carnal intercourse against the order of nature” compels LGBT persons to lead closeted lives. She emphasised that Sexual orientation is an innate part of the identity of LGBTQ individuals. The sexual orientation of a person is an essential attribute of privacy. Its protection lies at the core of Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Articles 14, 15, and 21.
  • Justice DY Chandrachud emphasised that members of the LGBT community are entitled, like all citizens, to the full range of constitutional rights, including the liberties protected by the Constitution and members of the LGBT community are entitled to the benefit of equal citizenship without discrimination, and to the equal protection of the law. 

CONCLUSION:

Every person in this world deserves to choose their sexual partners and sexual preferences. Even though the LGBTQ community comprises only a small fraction of the population, discrimination against them must be monitored and curbed.  The judgement made in the Navtej Singh Johar case upheld the rights of the LGBTQ community people and made a big step towards a positive perception of the community in the eyes of society. The struggle of the LGBTQ community for recognition of their rights has been happening for a long period of time;. However, although Section 377 has decriminalized same-sex relations, they are still fighting to legally recognise their marriage. It is time for society to accept the LGBTQ community and to let them live with dignity since, for a society to get uplifted, every section of society has to be uplifted. 

INDEPENDENT THOUGHT V. UNION OF INDIA: CASE COMMENT AND ANALYSIS

This Case Summary is written by Ruchita Yadav, a student at Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, Lucknow

INTRODUCTION

On October 11 2017, the Supreme Court for the first time addressed the government’s obligation towards the Constitutional and Human rights to address child marriages and related aspects of intersectionality. Among several issues, the critical issue was of marital rape with girl children. The article is a case comment on the case, brief and informative account of findings of the court, government’s negligence and absurd defenses. The article aptly covers each aspect related to the case with blend of critical analysis of the delivered judgment.

BACKGROUND/ FACTS OF CASE

An amendment under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 was in sixthly clause of S. 375 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 increasing the age for consent to sexual intercourse from 16 to 18. That means, whether consensual or non-consensual sexual intercourse with a girl child i.e., less than 18 years of age, is rape. But, Exception 2 to aforesaid section permits husband to have non-consensual sexual intercourse with his wife when she’s between 15 to 18 years of age isn’t amounting to rape. 

Independent Thought, a National Human Rights Organization filed a writ petition under Article 32A with view to draw attention towards gross violation of human rights of married girl child between 15 to 18 years of age, therefore, challenging Constitutionality and legality of Exception 2 of S. 375, IPC. Child Rights Trust, a non-governmental organization which works on Child Marriage prevention, joined as an intervenor was also heard extensively. The Home Ministry under the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government filed counter-affidavit in support of the Exception.

ISSUES INVOLVED

  1. Whether sexual intercourse between a man and his wife being a girl between 15 and 18 years of age is rape?
  2. Whether Exception 2 to S. 375, IPC is discriminatory between a married and unmarried girl child?
  3. Is the Court creating a new offence?

CONTENTIONS

  • Petitioner/ Independent Thought

S. 375 of IPC prescribes the age of consent for sexual intercourse as 18 years meaning thereby consensual or non-consensual, any person having intercourse with a girl below 18 years would be statutorily guilty of rape. Exception 2 of S. 375 allows husband of girl child to have non-consensual sexual intercourse with her, thus, taking away their right to bodily integrity.

  • Respondent/ Union of India

The Union of India contended that 15 years age of girl child has been retained in Exception 2 of S. 375 of IPC considering the social realities of nation, providing protection to husband and wife against criminalizing sexual activity between them because child marriages still take place due to uneven economic and educational development in country and it wouldn’t be appropriate viewing socio-economic conditions of nations and due to traditional practices.  Indian tradition evident child marriages and such traditions must be respected and not completely destroyed. Also, criminalizing consummation of a marriage union with a serious offence wouldn’t be appropriate and practical as per of estimation by National Family Health Survey – III which says that there are 23 million child brides in nation.

Through entering into marital relationship, the girl child consents to sexual intercourse with her husband either express or implied. Whatever be the objective petitioner sought to achieve, the marital status of girl child between 15 to 18 years of age has no rational nexus with the objective. Declaring sexual intercourse between girl child and her husband as rape would be a too much intervention in their marital affairs, thus, harming the institution of marriage.

SUPREME COURT’S FINDINGS & JUDGMENT

Division bench of Court refrained itself from giving any opinion on “marital rape” and said that it restricts itself to the issue at hand i.e., whether sexual intercourse by husband with her wife who is a girl child (15-18 years of age) constitutes rape and related issues. The Apex Court found and reacted on following aspects:

Antithetical statutes and Government’s negligence

As per S. 2(d) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, Child is a person below 18 years of age. S. 2(12) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 and S. 2(a) of the Protection of Child Marriage Act, 2006 defines Child to be “a person who hasn’t completed 18 years of age”. 

The preamble of the POCSO act recognizes the best interests and well being of children to be of paramount importance to ensure healthy, physical, social and mental well-being. Enacted with consonance of Art. 15(3) of the Constitution, it pinpoints sexual harassment/ violence as heinous crimes. As per POCSO’s provisions, sexual intercourse with a child is a heinous crime and thus, unlawful criminal activity. Exception 2 of S. 375, IPC is clearly contradictory to provisions of the act and its preamble. The duality is that, husband having sexual intercourse with his wife who is a girl child is not rape but is ‘aggravated penetrative sexual assault under S.5(n) of the POCSO Act and thus, punishable.

The JJ act relatable to Art. 13 of the Constitution says that when a girl is married before attaining the age of marriage, the family members, parents and guardian or whoever is taking care of child should be held responsible for marriage. Art. 34 of Convention on the rights of Child, which India is signatory to, binds the nation to forge measures ensuring best interests and health of children. But the Central Government seems to have divided opinions for safeguarding interests of a married and unmarried girl child. Through these conflicting and contradictory provisions, it’s clear that Parliament is ambivalent and ambiguous over issue of criminalizing child marriages and solving the problem pertaining to contradictory statutes.

Violation of Constitutional and Human Rights

Child marriages lead to pernicious physiological and psychological health of girl children. The apex Court also took help of several reports establishing economic costs of child marriages and implications and adverse challenges faced by girl children leaving heavy toll on girls’ mental health. Exception 2 of S. 375, IPC besides providing blanket protection, freedom to husbands for rape but not for lesser sexual act as per S. 354A of IPC constitutes an anomalous and astounding situation. This leads to violation of right to bodily integrity recognized in privacy context, productive choices which is part of Article 21, sexual and reproductive health, decision-making power, basic freedoms and exposes them to violence of abuse ranging from controlling and inequitable behavior, negative physical and psychological consequences such as traumatic experience after sexual violence. 

Depriving them of freedom, opportunity for personal development have serious consequences on girl children such as early pregnancy, maternal and neonatal mortality destroys entire psychology and pushes them into deep emotional crisis. This is how exception leads to gross violation of Art. 15(3), 14 and 21. The court emphasizes upon the fundamental rights of girls which must be upheld regardless of their marital status and denial of constitutional and would dilute the implementation of law against child marriage.

S. 2(d) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 defines human rights as “rights relating to liberty, equality and dignity”. Undoubtedly, sexual intercourse with a girl child without her will or consent would amount to violation of human right. This stance is supported in the Convention on the Rights of Child (the CRC) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against the Women (the CEDAW).

Violation of rights can’t be justified in name of tradition

The bench aptly pointed out that the Parliament must act rationally and put reasonable thoughts before making a custom as law. In Satyawati Sharma, it was noted that the legislation which might be in compliance with needs during that time might relapse with change in times, needs and dynamics of society and thus, such legislation need to be changed. Also, with change in time the legislation might become arbitrary.

 The bench further pontified that “constitutional morality” requires preventing endangerment of girls and safeguarding their rights. This can be ensured through proper implementation of existing provisions, clearing out all ambiguities in statutes, forging measures to improve educational status of girl children. An absurd tradition can’t be defended to be followed or declared legal just because it’s a tradition. The government’s defense of protecting a tradition was strongly criticized.

JUDGMENT

Justice Lokur found the only pragmatic and viable solution as to have harmonious and purposive construction of Exception 2 of S.375 of IPC to be in consonance with the spirit of POCSO Act and other pro-child legislations, treaties and conventions that India is signatory of. On the other hand, Justice Gupta held that Exception is liable to struck down as it’s whimsical, arbitrary and capricious. Both judges agreed that, now onwards Exception 2 of S. 375, IPC is to be read as, “Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under eighteen years of age, is not rape.”

The Exception 2 is discriminatory in nature as it distinguishes between a married and unmarried girl child without any reasonable nexus which also violates their constitutional rights. Justice Lokur uttered that by partially or fully striking down the exception, there’s no cavil of doubt that the Court can’t create an offence. Justice Gupta said that the court isn’t creating new offence, but removing what was unconstitutional and offensive.

DISPOSITION & CRITICAL ANALYSIS 

The judgment called for harmonization of the legal framework and addressed several issues of obscurity and uncertainty through clear discussion. For instance, Gupta J. specified that the PCMA has primacy over religion-based personal laws. Both judges had concurring opinion and uttered that married girls should be considered “children in need of care and protection”. The bench pointed out factors that were detrimental to girl children’s overall development, physical and psychological health and concerning with their basic rights. Also, the bench adopted transparent approach in dealing and strike right to the conflicting status of statutes and non-compliance of the Central government with Conventions.

But, somehow, the Apex Court deliberately left out the opportunity to deliver an inclusive verdict targeting the whole issue of “marital rape”. It didn’t take suo moto cognizance of the matter since long time, because the PCMA act with its enactment in 2006 and criminal law amendment act of 2013 focused upon this point, though obliquely and directly respectively. The Court could have put the record straight over the issue of marital rape and utilize the opportunity in more effective manner.

India is one of those several nations who haven’t criminalized marital rape. Arbitrariness of provision which provide punishment for domestic violence, or being hit, injured, physically or mentally by her husband or in-laws would be punishable but the sexual intercourse without her will or consent won’t be designated as rape. This paradoxical situation postulated in statutes reflect the true intentions of makers to not to be called “left-behind” by not substantiating issues such as domestic violence and child marriage and to protect age old traditions and ill-mentality without no reasonable nexus.

CONCLUSION

Consent is an essential element in all important things, that too free consent. Subsequently, minor is not considered fit to consent over matters, for instance in Contracts. When it’s evident that an individual’s mental and physical development isn’t complete by the age of 18 years, how come the government found sexual intercourse with a minor individual fine and give blanket protection to such heinous offence on the name of “importance of tradition”. This is probably because of neglected aspect of gender insensitivity, which perpetuates in an individual’s brain irrespective of the positions they hold and impact of absurd traditions over vulnerable section of society. Instances of gender insensitivity, absence of inclusivity are still visible in Administrative and Judiciary’s actions. Long term developmental steps such as holding webinars and short-term courses regularly are important.

Rajesh Sharma Ors. v. State of UP Anr. [2017 SCC Online SC 821]

This Case Summary is written by Ishita Gupta, a student at Vivekananda Institute Of Professional Studies, GGSIPU

Background 

Due to cultural and religious factors, India has historically been a patriarchal society. For generations, we have adhered to the traditional convention that women are inferior to males in all aspects of life. Though the paternalistic viewpoint has weakened over time, the notion of male superiority remains intact. Women are restricted to domestic duties and the management of the home and family. The legislation that rules us, as well as associated jurisprudence, reflects this women’s subjection, based on the same belief.  One of area of concern is Dowry continues to remain a major social evil which creates life threatening consequences for women. Section 498-A was inserted in the Indian Penal Code in 1983  , and is an offence arising from marital discord in a marriage. This malicious practice degrades the status of women and reduces them to objects, value of which surges with bigger dowry. Such evil results in women being ill-treated, harassed, killed, divorced for the simple reason. Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.) defines the offence of matrimonial  cruelty. Under the Section, offenders are subject to jail as well as a fine, and the offence is not bailable. Although the two sections are not mutually exclusive, both offences and those acquitted under Section 304B are separate.

Facts of the Case

  • Rajesh Sharma and Sneha Sharma got married on November 28, 2012. 
  • Sneha Sharma’s father provided the appellant with a dowry to the best of his ability. However, the appellants were dissatisfied with the dowry amount and began assaulting the complainant, who was assaulted and abused on a regular basis by the husband. The demand was made of dowry of Rs.3,00,000/- and a car which the family could not arrange
  • Due to the harassment Sneha’s pregnancy had been terminated, the appellant then abandoned her at her home.
  • Rajesh Sharma was summoned under IPC sections 498A and 323. The wife has filed a complaint against the husband and their relative, the Appellant, in the case. 
  • The wife also claimed that her husband made dowry demands and that she was harassed by the appellant and his family members while she was pregnant, resulting in the termination of her pregnancy. After perusal of the file and the document brought on record. 
  • As a result of the prima facie case, the trial court called appellant. The appellants went to the High Court to have the summons quashed, but the court dismissed their request. Thereafter, the High Court found no ground to interfere with the order of summoning and dismissed the petition. Hence this appeal.
  • As a result, the appellants filed an appeal in the Supreme Court against the High Court’s decision

Issues before the court 

  • Is it necessary to check the tendency to rope all family members in resolving a matrimonial dispute?
  • Are there rules required to prevent the abuse of Section 498A?
  • Whether the family of the offender will be punished in the act and how to spare the honest people. 

CONTENTIONS

PETITIONERS 

 the Petitions were instituted seeking directions to the respondents to create an enabling environment for married women subjected to cruelty to make informed choices and to create a uniform system of monitoring and systematically reviewing incidents of violence against women under Section 498A of IPC

It was also contended the Petitioners in the case for a uniform policy of registration of FIR, arrest and bail in cases of Section 498A of IPC i.e., to immediately register FIR on complaint of cruelty and harassment by married women as per the IPC.

.The Petitioners’ main argument in the case was that the social purpose of Section 498A of the IPC was being lost because the rigour of the provision had been diluted and the offence had been effectively made bailable due to various qualifications and restrictions prescribed by various decisions of this Court.

RESPONDENTS

The Main contention raised in support of this appeal by the appellant side  is that there is a need to check the tendency to rope in all family members in a matrimonial dispute. Allegations against all relatives of the husband cannot be taken at face value when in normal course it may only be the husband or at best his parents. It was also stated that respondent No.2 herself left the matrimonial home. Appellant No.2, father of appellant No.1, is a retired government employee. Appellant No.3 is a house wife. Appellant No.4 is unmarried brother and appellant No.5 is unmarried sister who is a government employee. Appellants Vijay Sharma, Jaywati Sharma, Praveen Sharma and Priyanka Sharma  had no interest in making any demand of dowry. 

Judgement

The session court in its judgment found Rajesh Sharma guilty under section 498A. But later Sneha summoned her parents in law and the brother and sister of the husband. The said petition was accepted by session judge on 3rd July 2014. The appellant then approached the High Court against the order of summoning. Though the matter was referred to mediation center but without any avail. Then the High Court found no ground to support this petition and rejected it. Court also constituted a family welfare  committee and every case related to dowry will go to this committee which gives this committee uncheck power and it can work as a justice dispensation system.

No arrest will be done until the committee gives its report to the magistrate that shows the justice to the victim will be delayed.

This ruling was issued in order to put an end to the harassment and persecution of the husband and family members in fraudulent dowry cases  The supreme court thoroughly evaluated all of the events and issues, and issued numerous instructions on cases brought falsely in order to exact retribution.. The committee’s major goal is to separate the genuine cases from the fraudulent ones. married guy. The provisions of the IPC are being substantially misapplied, according to the court. Provide relief to those who have been the victims of malicious complaints. The accused cannot be excused from appearing in court if he or she is not in the jurisdiction, however video conferencing can be utilised to replace human appearances..

The magistrate’s decision is based solely on his or her experience, and the judgement reflects that. The majority of the cases that the precedent judges used to support their conclusion that 498A is being abused demonstrates their male-predominant viewpoint. 

ANALYSIS

The decision is crucial as its recognized  dowry-related offences, as it prevents the victimisation and harassment of an innocent husband and his relatives

In this case, the Supreme Court agreed that the dowry provision of the Indian penal code had been abused. It is interpreting the goal of the clause, which is to restore innocent people’s human rights. The purpose of this decision was to investigate a complaint made to the police and magistrates. Further, the objective of this committee was to see genuine cases and to opt-out Fraudulent cases. But the fact that the judges ignored The case of the dowry reflects patriarchy and male norms. The rule has reduced physical violence and dowry-related offences to a significant extent, but judges have refused to admit it. The fact that NCRB statistics only indicates the number of cases filed and only 14% of them are found guilty demonstrates the complexities of Indian justice.. For many women, the daily occurrence of violence and stigmatization has been so normalized that they have internalized these things and they only approach a court when the case is of extreme violence. Every case related to dowry will go to this committee which gives this committee uncheck power , which can left a lot of scope for arbitrariness o arrest will be done until the committee gives its report to the magistrate. Committee members who act as a judicial body can be influenced and bribed by accused

CONCLUSION 

Rajesh Sharma vs State of Uttar Pradesh judgment reflects how justice for women in Indian society is far from realized. The court needed to re-examine the effect and purpose of the law and then judge the case. The major problem our judicial system has, is the falling acknowledge and judicial recognition of rights of women.  As a result, the judiciary should reexamine the effect and purpose of law and take appropriate action.

SHATRUGHAN CHAUHAN ANR V. UNION OF INDIA

This Case Summary is written by Nandini Arya, a student at National Law University, Jodhpur

SYNOPSIS

The Shatrughan Chauhan case is indeed a landmark judgement delivered by the honourable Supreme Court of India. It upheld death-row convicts’ rights irrespective of the nature of the crime committed. The court held that capital punishment of death-row convicts could be commuted if there is an inordinate and unreasonable delay by the executive or if the convict suffers from insanity. The court also held that the death-row convicts could not be kept in solitary confinement. Despite its merits, the judgement has raised certain apprehensions among various legal scholars and jurists. It is also pertinent to note that human-rights activists demand the abolition of capital punishment altogether. Thus, there’s a long way to go in the field of human rights.

BACKGROUND

In Devender Pal Singh Bhullar vs. State (NCT) of Delhi, the court held that mere delay cannot be the sole basis for clemency. The case also distinguished between the death-row convicts booked under TADA and other death-row convicts. 

The petitioners in the present case represent death-row convicts. These death-row convicts have been waiting for years for their mercy petition to be decided. The death-row convicts are booked under various sections. Some of them are booked under TADA. 

A three-judge bench was formed by the Supreme Court to deliver the judgement. The bench being larger, overruled the ratio laid in Devender Pal Singh Bhullar vs. State (NCT) of Delhi. Mr T.R. Andhyarujina was appointed as the amicus-curiae of the case.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Several writ petitions were filed under article 32 of the Indian Constitution in the Supreme Court of India either by the death-row convicts or by their relatives or by People’s Union for Democratic Rights and other like-minded public-spirited bodies. After the death-row convicts were awarded capital punishment by the Supreme Court of India, a mercy petition was filed before the Governor or the President.

The petitioners have alleged unreasonable delay in rejecting the mercy petitions. Some of the petitioners have further stated that the death-row convicts were suffering from mental illness. Solitary confinement, judgments declared per incuriam and procedural lapses were other grounds for filing the writ petition.

Thus, the petitioners have prayed that the death sentence rendered to the convicts be commuted to life imprisonment after the mercy petition has been rejected by the President and the Governor. The petitioners prayed that the rejection of mercy petitions by the President and the Governor in the present case be declared as ultra vires. 

It was further prayed that a set of guidelines be formed by the Supreme Court of India when a mercy petition is to be considered and the rights of death row convicts are duly protected by the Supreme Court.  

ISSUES

  1. Whether unreasonable delay in rejecting a mercy petition can be a valid ground for commuting the death sentence into life imprisonment?
  2. Whether the mental illness of a death-row convict be regarded as a valid ground for commuting the death sentence into life imprisonment?
  3. Whether solitary confinement of a death-row convict be regarded as a valid ground for commuting the death sentence into life imprisonment?
  4. Whether procedural lapses in rejecting a mercy petition be regarded as a valid ground for commuting the death sentence into life imprisonment?
  5. Whether the judgements declared per incuriam later by the Supreme Court be regarded as a valid ground for commuting the death sentence into life imprisonment?

CONTENTIONS

The petitioners have argued the following – 

  1. The decision of the death penalty is not being challenged rather the supervening events that occurred after the confirmation of the death penalty are the basis for filing the petition.
  2. The mercy petitions of the death-row convicts were rejected without taking into account the supervening circumstances such as delay, solitary confinement, insanity, procedural lapses and judgements declared per incuriam.
  3. Executing a death penalty after an inordinate and unreasonable delay would infringe the death-row convicts’ fundamental right under article 21. Hence, the convict can approach the court by filing a writ petition.
  4. Human life is sacred and inviolable. Therefore, every effort shall be made to protect it.
  5. The death-row convicts are protected under article 21 till their last breath. It includes the death-row convicts which were booked under TADA.
  6. The procedure for rejecting a mercy petition was not duly followed and hence, it led to serious injustice to both the death-row convicts and their families.

The respondents have argued the following –

  1. For examining a mercy petition, many documents have to be procured from various authorities. Thus, it takes a lot of time.
  2. There cannot a specific time limit to decide a mercy petition. It varies on the number of mercy petitions filed, the nature of the case and the scope of inquiry to be made.
  3. The courts cannot fix any time limit on their own since no time limit is fixed for the president under article 72 for the same.
  4. The power of the president under article 72 is discretionary and it overrides all laws, rules and regulations in force.
  5. Delay by itself does not entail the person under sentence of death to request for commutation of a sentence into life imprisonment. It is against the victim’s interest.
  6. Delay in the execution of a death sentence must not be a ground for commutation because the crime committed by the accused is heinous.
  7. The judiciary should not decide if an unreasonable delay is apparent. The matter should be referred back to the executive.
  8. The death-row convicts were not kept under solitary confinement. They were statutorily segregated for safety purposes.
  9. The cases, on which various courts have prescribed the death penalty to the death-row convicts at present, were not held to be per incuriam by any court.
  10. There were no procedural lapses involved. 

FINDINGS

On the basis of the facts and the arguments advanced from both the parties, the court held the following –

  1. The power of the President and the Governor to grant pardon is distinct, absolute and unfettered in nature. This power to grant pardon is not limited to death sentence cases.
  2. The executive orders regarding the grant of pardon are under limited judicial review with only the manner of exercise of executive power being under judicial review.
  3. Long undue delay in the execution of a death sentence entitles the death-row convict to approach the court under article 32. Long undue delay causes adverse physical conditions and psychological stresses on the death-row convict.
  4. Article 21 of the Constitution extends to the stage of execution of the sentence and undue, inordinate and unreasonable delay in execution of death sentence attribute to torture which violates Article 21. 
  5. Insanity is a relevant supervening factor for consideration and the person declared insane cannot be executed under article 21.
  6. Solitary confinement is not sanctioned by Section 30 of the Prisons Act for death-row convicts. It would amount to infliction of “additional and separate” punishment not authorized by law. 
  7. The contention by the petitioners that the judgements on which the court relied have been held per incuriam does not hold any ground. These judgements were clarified and they were not applied in some special cases.

REASONING

The court gave the following reasons for its decision –

  1. The power of the President and the governor under article 72 and article 161 respectively is a constitutional duty. It is neither a matter of grace nor a matter of privilege. 
  2. The court has limited judicial review powers because there’s a presumption that the executive works with an application of mind and it is irrelevant to lay down specific guidelines.
  3. The manner of exercise of executive orders is subject to judicial review to ensure that the constitutional authorities consider all the relevant materials before concluding.
  4. The right of the convicts under article 21 should be considered along with the right of the victims.
  5. The procedure prescribed by law, which deprives a person of his life and liberty must be just, fair and reasonable.
  6. The death-row convicts in the present case have approached the court as a victim of the violation of guaranteed fundamental rights under the Constitution seeking commutation of sentence.
  7. All the cases of capital punishment fall under the rarest of rare case. Thus, there cannot be a further distinction between the convicts.
  8. No decision was held per-incuriam. Rather they were clarified and distinguished from that case.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

This landmark case attempted to ‘humanise’ capital punishment. Before this judgement, the process related to infliction of capital punishment after it has been announced by the Supreme Court was entirely under the executive domain. This judgment held that there can be judicial intervention if the executive function is discharged arbitrarily.

This judgement was important since there was no check on the process of mercy petition before. It gives a ray of hope to human rights activist. Even though capital punishment is in itself against humanity, this judgement is a step towards recognizing convicts’ rights. This judgement refused to distinguish between death-row convicts based on the nature of the crime. Thus, it overruled Devender Pal Singh Bhullar’s case.

The executive can no longer delay the mercy petition by giving unreasonable excuses. The honourable court has struck a perfect balance between the victim’s rights and the convict’s rights. The court also did commendable work in maintaining the doctrine of “separation of powers”.

However, despite various positive effects of the judgement, the following are the apprehensions raised by various scholars, legal jurists and lawyers –

  1. There’s an apprehension that the victim’s right might be curtailed by commuting the convict’s punishment. Also, the convict may exploit the procedural lapses and lead to a delay in his mercy petition. Thus, apprehension was on the rise during the Nirbhaya case.
  2. Nick Robinson has rightly said that there are many supreme courts of India. The supreme court has not shown a consistent approach in its judgement. While it upheld the convict’s rights, it has failed to properly recognise the LGBTQ+ community’s rights as a natural human right.
  3. There are only a few countries left where capital punishment is present. India is one of them. It is high time that capital punishment is absolved altogether.
  4. The honourable court, in this case, relied on certain foreign cases as well. However, in various instances, the court has reprimanded the counsels for relying on foreign cases.
  5. We must respect the established constitutional mechanism and delay should not be the sole basis for clemency. Other supervening circumstances should also be taken into account.

CONCLUSION

This landmark judgement has assured the death-row convicts of some rights. The Supreme Court has also framed various guidelines in this judgement. It was just short of providing a time frame within which the executive should dispose of the mercy petition. The court held that insanity and inordinate delay alone can be a ground for clemency.

 However, there has been a huge cry for the abolition of capital punishment altogether. But the Supreme Court, in this case, justified death by hanging as the most humane way of killing someone. Given the circumstances, the Supreme Court and the legislature should contemplate abolishing capital punishment altogether. There is also a need to expand the horizon of human rights in the country. This judgement is the first step towards this. However, there’s a need for more steps to be taken by the court.  

Check out LAW MENTOR for Case Summary

Rajesh Kumar vs State of UP and Anr.

This Case Summary is written by Riyaa Jain, a student at Vivekananda Institute of Professional Studies

INTRODUCTION

Due to cultural and religious issues, India has historically been a patriarchal culture. For generations, we have adhered to the traditional convention that women are inferior to males in all aspects of life. In this recent decision, the Supreme Court’s Three-Judge Bench modified the Supreme Court’s much-discussed orders issued last year in Rajesh Sharma and ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr. The Supreme Court has now changed the orders, ruling that the creation of a third agency and the powers it was given were illegal. The central issue in the appeal was the need to curb the claimed inclination of women who file a complaint under Section 498A to enlist the help of all family members in resolving matrimonial disputes.

BACKGROUND

In the decade of 1980, dowry deaths rose at an alarming rate in India. The Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.), 1860, was amended by the Criminal Law (2nd Amendment) Act, 1983, and the new section 498A under Chapter XX-A, “Of Cruelty By Husband Or Relatives Of Husband,” was inserted on the 26th of December, 1983, to facilitate rapid intervention by the state and protect young women who were unable to meet the unlawful demands of their in-laws. The amendment centred on dowry killings and incidences of in-law brutality toward married women. To reinforce this provision, subsequent adjustments to the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) of 1973 and the Indian Evidence Act of 1872 were made by the same alteration.

 

FACTS OF THE CASE

Dowry has been the real menace in Indian society. Rajesh Sharma and Sneha Sharma got married on 28th November 2012 and father of Sneha Sharma gave the appellant dowry to his fullest capacity. But appellants were not happy with the amount of dowry and they started abusing and harassing the complainant. She was daily beaten and exploited by her husband. They demanded from her dowry worth Rs 3,00,000 and a car which could not be arranged by the family. On 10th November, 2013 the plaintiff was dropped off at her matrimonial home by the appellant. Later, she got pregnant and had undergone immense pain due to which her pregnancy was terminated. The main argument advanced in favour of this appeal is that the tendency to involve all family members in resolving a matrimonial conflict must be curtailed. Allegations against all of the husband’s relatives cannot be taken at face value because, in most cases, only the husband or, at best, his parents are accused of demanding dowry or causing maltreatment.

ISSUES OF THE CASE

1. Throughout history, women have been mistreated and subjugated. At this point, they need to be more empowered in order to achieve social equality and national success.

2. The issue, in this case, was whether the family of the accused be also detained in the act and how to save the innocents.

3. The ruling has been challenged on a number of grounds, including that the Supreme Court overstepped its bounds in legislating. As a result, the central question before the Court in the case was whether the Court in Rajesh Sharma could have issued such directives based on the technique of interpretation.

CONTENTIONS FROM RESPONDENT

The respondent’s counsel argues that there is a growing trend to exploit the provision to enlist the support of everyone in the family, including ageing parents, younger siblings, and grandparents predicated on speculative and exaggerated claims, and uncles without any physical or mental ailment being documented injuries or property damage. Innocent family members, especially women and older persons, are sometimes harassed and even arrested as a result of this. This could jeopardize any chance of a relationship reconciling and reuniting. The Petitioners also asked for an unified policy of filing FIRs, arresting suspects, and issuing bail in situations involving Section 498A of the IPC, i.e., to immediately file a FIR on an allegation of cruelty and harassment by married women under the IPC. The Petitioners’ main argument in the case was that the social purpose of Section 498A of the IPC was being lost as the rigour of the provision was diluted and the offence was effectively made bailable due to various qualifications and restrictions imposed by various decisions of this Court, including its recent decision in the case of Rajesh Sharma and others.

 

FINDINGS

The factors neglected by SUPREME COURT are:

1. Low filling rate: Many cases of domestic violence and dowry do not even make it to court, according to reports. There are various causes for this, including dependent women, a lack of family support, and a low literacy rate, among others.

2. Unfruitful civil society interruption: We’ve noticed that dismantling civil society isn’t always beneficial. They may establish a parallel court system, which might be detrimental. Consider the recent case of cow vigilantes.

JUDGEMENT

The Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court headed by Chief Justice Dipak Mishra while holding that Supreme Court’s directions pertaining to Family Welfare Committee and its constitution by the District Legal Services Authority and the power conferred on the Committee is impermissible made the following notable observations in the case:

1. That in the instance of Rajesh Sharma, a third agency has been introduced that has nothing to do with the Code, and that aside from that, the Committees have been given the authority to propose a report without which no arrest may be undertaken. The order to settle a dispute after it has been filed is not a legal expression. When a settlement is reached, both parties may submit a petition under Section 482 CrPC, which the High Court may dismiss based on the petition’s merits.

2. In support of a fundamental right, the Court has issued instructions in the absence of law in a number of cases, according to the Court. However, because there are statutory rules and decisions in the field, the directions pertaining to the formation of a Committee and the delegation of authority to the said Committee are incorrect.

3. That though adequate conditions must be imposed when an application for bail is considered, the recovery of disputed dowry items may not be a cause for denying an application for bail under Section 498A of the IPC.

4. The Supreme Court has also ordered that each state’s Director General of Police ensure that investigating officers in charge of cases involving violations under Section 498A of the IPC receive thorough training in the principles outlined by this Court regarding arrest.

ANALYSIS

The analysis made by the Court of the National Crime Records Bureau data is quite questionable.  According to NCRB statistics, 10.56 percent of cases filed under Section 498A in 2005 were ultimately deemed false due to a factual or legal error. According to the NCRB, the rate was dropped to 9.32 percent in 2009. The Court also remarked on the low conviction rate in Section 498A cases. There is a case to be made that India’s general conviction rate is extremely low for all types of crimes, not just those under Section 498A. As a result, a low conviction rate should not be regarded as a misuse of the law. Inadequate investigation, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt, reconciliation between the spouses, and other factors could all contribute to the increased acquittal percentage. Furthermore, the judgement began by implying that the guidelines would be intended to prevent the arrest of the accused husband’s innocent, elderly, and non-Indian dwelling relatives. This was left out, and the umbrella of protection was extended to all of the defendants, including the husband. This greatly diminishes the merit of the said decision, which has been dubbed “an exercise in male bonding” by several groups. To protect the husband’s unknowing relatives from being harassed by Section 498A, the Court may have established clear instructions prohibiting the arrest of such people alone. The Family Welfare Committees may have been given the authority to look into the case only in relation to other accused people, not the main suspect. By subjecting the primary accused, the husband, to the strict provisions of Section 498A, a balance could have been struck between protecting the complainant’s rights and preventing false implication of the husband’s relatives in the case by making their arrest subject to the Family Welfare Committee’s report.

CONCLUSION

In this case, the Court gave more impetus to the rights of the accused husband and his relatives, than those of the complainant woman. The fact exists that women have been discriminated against and continue to be so. For good reason, legislation aimed at providing better legal protection to these people against gender-specific offences are in place. Despite modernisation and “woman development,” no major progress has been made in reducing crimes against women. Women have the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution and the right to equality under Article 15 of the Constitution, thanks to laws like S. 498A. Discrimination in one of its most basic forms is denying a given sex the legal protection it requires.

The possibility of misuse is a regrettable but all-too-common side effect of enforcing a law. Many legal provisions are utilised to harass innocent persons, and S. 498A is no exception. However, the extent of its misuse does not outweigh the positive changes it has brought about in society. The instructions given in this case will only act as roadblocks to Section 498A’s appropriate execution. Women’s rights activists and legal experts across the country are anxiously awaiting the Supreme Court of India’s judicial review of this decision.

 

 

Abhilasha v. Parkash [2020 SCC Online SC 736]

To get daily updates, Join Team Attorneylex’s WhatsApp group

Also, check us out on Instagram and Twitter

This Case Summary is written by Mayank rathor, a student at New Law College, Pune

Table Of Content

  • Introduction and background
  • Fact of case
  • Argument
  • Appellate argument
  • Respondent argument 
  • Issue
  • Case laws referred by the supreme court
  • Judgment
  • Critical analysis of the judgment
  • Conclusion

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The law of maintenance has its own importance. According to general and social concept of maintenance, it is the duty of man to maintain his entire family. In legal sense maintenance is the amount which is paid by a man to his dependent wife, children or parents to maintain themselves. 

Section 3( b) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance act defines maintenance ,1956. The concept of maintenance is not only recognised by all the personal law but also by the code of criminal procedure, 1973. However, the applicability of the

maintenance under personal law refers to the people belonging to that particular religion while a plea for maintenance under criminal procedure code, 1973 can be filled by the person irrespective of the caste, creed and religion. 

Abhilasha v. Parkash , is a appeal decided by the 3 judge bench of supreme Court, consisting of Hon’ble justice Ashok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy and M. r. shah. 

In the present case, a situation is arise whether the court can exercised the jurisdiction under section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance act, 1956.when a maintenance application filed under section 125 of Cr.P.C. The court give the view that an unmarried hindu daughter can claim maintenance from her father till she married relying on section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance act, 1956 provided she pleads and proves that she is unable to maintain herself and nor under section 125 of Cr.P.C. .

Whether the unmarried major daughter claim maintain under section 125 of  Cr.P.C. although she is not suffering from any physical or mental abnormality or injury. 

Fact of Case

An application of maintenance filed by the mother of the appellant under section on 125 of  Cr.P.C. on behalf of herself, her two sons and the appellant ( daughter) against her husband (Parkash), claiming maintenance for herself and her three children. The learned judiciary magistrate of first class dismissed the application filed under section 125 of Cr.P.C. against appellant mother and her two brothers, but allowed the same for appellant for grant of maintenance till she attains the age of majority. Against this judgment, all the four applicants filled a criminal revision before the court of Sessions judge and the same was dismissed by the additional session judge with only modification that appellant was entitled to receive maintenance till 26 April 2005 instead of 7 February 2005,which was the date when she attain majority. Challenging the order of Sessions judge as well the judicial magistrate, an application under section 482 Cr.P.C. was filled before the high court by all the applicants, the same was dismissed by the high court. Aggrieved from the order passed by the high court, an appeal was filed by the appellant (Abhilasha) who is the daughter of respondent. 

Appellant’s Argument

The appellant in the supreme Court, argued that even though the appellant had attained majority on 26 April 2005 , but since she is unmarried, she is entitled to claim maintenance from her father. Learned senior counsel contends thar high court committed error in dismissing the application fiked under section 482 of Cr.P.C. of the appellant on wrong premise that since appellant had attained majority and is not suffering from any physical or mental abnormality, she is not entitled for any maintenance. Learned senior counsel relied on provision of section 20 of the Hindu Adoption And Maintenance act, 1956 and submits that as per section 20 obligation of a person to maintain his daughter, who is unmarried extends till she is married. Learned senior counsel relies on judgment of this Court in Jagdish Jugtawat Vs. Manju Lata and Others in support of her submission. She submits that High Court committed error in taking a contrary view to the above judgment of this Court. Ms. Learned senior counsel submits that appellant is still unemployed, hence, she is entitled to claim maintenance from her father.

Respondent’s Argument

The counsel for the respondent agree with the submission of the learned senior counsel for the appellant contends that Courts below have rightly confined the claim of the maintenance of the appellant till she attains majority on 26.04.2005. It is submitted that as per Section 125 Cr.P.C. entitlement to claim maintenance by daughter, who has attained majority is confined to case where the person by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain herself. Revisional Court has returned a finding that there is no case that appellant is by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury is unable to maintain herself. It is submitted that High Court has rightly dismissed the application filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. of the appellant since no case was made out to interfere in orders passed by the Judicial Magistrate and learned Revisional Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

Issues

  1. Whether the appellant, who although had attained majority and is still unmarried is entitled to claim maintenance from her father in proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. although she is not suffering from any physical or mental abnormality/injury? 
  2. Whether the orders passed by learned Judicial Magistrate as well as learned Revisional Court limiting the claim of the appellant to claim maintenance till she attains majority on 26.04.2005 deserves to be set aside with direction to the respondent No.1 to continue to give maintenance even after 26.04.2005 till the appellant remains unmarried? 

Case laws referred by the supreme Court

  • A number of cases were referred by the supreme Court in order to deliver this judgment. Reliance was placed on precedent to understand the scope and ambit of section 488 of Cr.P.C., 1898, section 20 of Hindu Marriage And Maintenance Act, 1956 and section 125 of Cr.P.C., 1972.
  • The Court referred to the case of Nanak Chand v. Chandra kishore Aggarwal and Others, the Court held that there is no inconsistency between section 488 of Cr.P.C. and the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance act and both can stand together. This Court further held that section 488 Cr.P.C. and the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance act and both can stand together. This Court further held that section 488 of Cr.P.C. provides a summary remedy and is applicable to alll persons belonging to all religion and has no relationship with the personal law of the parties. 
  • Next case referred by the Court is Ram Singh v. State, Allahabad high court took the view that section 18 of Hindu Adoption and Minority act, 1956 cannot be substitute for section 488 of Cr.P.C. , 1898. Court observe as follows
  • “There is nothing in the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act to suggest expressly or by necessary implication that the Act is intended to be a substitute for the provisions of Section 488 Cr.P.C. In fact the provisions of Section 18 of the Act cannot be a substitute for Section 488 Cr.P.C.”
  • Next case referred by the Court is Nalini Ranjan v. Kiran Rani, Patna high court held that section 488 of Cr.P.C. provided a separate remedy and section 488 of Cr.P.C. covered the civil liability of an husband under the personal law. 
  • Next case referred by the court is Mahabir Agarwalla v. Gita Roy, . Court has made the following observation. 

“An alternative but not inconsistent summary remedy was provided by section 488 of the Cr.P.C.not only to the Hindu wife but generally to wives irrespective of religion for recovery of maintenance from the  husband. The two remedies were, however, not co-extensive.”

  • Next case discussed by the Court is Jagadish Jugtawat v. Manju and other. In this case, the family Court allowed maintenance for minor girl till she married under section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance act, 1956. The relevant portion of the judgment of the high court os quoted here

“ it cannot be said that the order impugned runs counter to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the provisions of section 125 CrPC are applicable irrespective of the personal law and it does not make any distinction whether the daughter claiming maintenance is a Hindu or a Muslim. However, taking an overall view of the matter, I, with all respect to the Hon’ble Court, am of the candid view that the provisions require literal interpretation and a daughter would cease to have the benefit of the provisions under section 125 CrPC on attaining majority, though she would be entitled to claim the benefits further under the statute/personal law. But the Court is not inclined to interfere, as the order does not result in miscarriage of justice, rather interfering with the order would create great inconvenience to Respondent 3 as she would be forced to file another petition under sub-section (3) of section 20 of the Act of 1956 for further maintenance etc. Thus, in order to  avoid multiplicity of litigations, the order impugned does not warrant interference.”

Judgment

The Supreme Court after listening to both sides of the story and examining the witnesses came to the conclusion as to the first issue that the right of unmarried daughter under section 20 to claim maintenance from her father when she is unable to maintain herself is absolute and the right given to unmarried daughter under section 20 is right granted under personal law, which can very well be enforced by her against her father, unmarried daughter is clearly entitled from maintenance from her father till she is married even though she has become major, which is statutory right recognised by section 20(3) and can be enforced by unmarried daughter in accordance with law.

The court held in related to second issue that the judicial magistrate while deciding proceedings under section 125 Cr.P.C. could not have exercised the jurisdiction under section 20(3) of act, 1956 and the submission of the appellant cannot be accepted that the court below should have allowed the application for maintenance even though she has become major. We do not find any infirmity in the order of the judicial magistrate first class as well as learned addition magistrate in not granting maintenance to appellant who has become major. Further the court accept the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that as preposition of law, an unmarried hindu daughter can claim maintenance from her father till  is married relying on section 20(3) of the act, 1956, provided she pleads and prove that she is unable to maintain herself . 

Critical analysis of judgment

The court decision under this case is appropriate because, the application made by appellant counsel under section 125 of Cr.P.C which provide maintenance for daughter till she attained majority and also after majority if she is mentally or physical incapable of maintain herself. Section 20(3) have no Overriding effect over section 125 . Both are exist together. The decision make it clear that under which court the person Institute a suit for maintenance according to its need and convenience.

The case made it clear in the suit of maintenance that 

  • If the parties to suit belong to city or town whose population exceeds one million then they must filed case in family court who has  jurisdiction to decide a case under Section 125 Cr.P.C. as well as the suit under Section 20 of Hindu Adoption amd Maintenance Act, 1956, in such case , Family Court can exercise jurisdiction under both the Acts and in an appropriate case can grant maintenance to unmarried daughter even though she has attained the age of majority. 
  • If there is no family court, proceedings under section 125 of Cr.P.C. shall have to be before the magistrate of the first class
  •  If Family Court is not established, a suit or proceedings for maintenance including the proceedings under Section 20 of the Act, 1956 shall only be before the District Court or any subordinate Civil Court.

Conclusion

 A Hindu is under a legal obligation to maintain his parents, his wife, his unmarried daughters, and his minor child whether he possesses any property or not. If a person is healthy and able – bodies ,he must be held you have means to support his wife, children and parents The obligation to maintain these relations is personal in character and arises from the  Very existence of the relation between the parties. The purpose of Section 125 Cr.P.C.  is to provide immediate relief through summary proceedings, whereas under Section 20 read with Section 3(b) of Act, 1956 contains larger right, which need to be decided by a Civil Court. Decision of judiciary magistrate of first class for not providing maintenance to appellant under section 20 of Hindu adoption and maintenance act was rightly decided. Every Court have to decide the case with in their sphere of power, so that power of different Court not overlapped and not cause miscarriage to justice system. However in the present case  justice be served by giving liberty to the appellant to  file the suit for maintenance under Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, if so advised, for claiming any maintenance against her father.

https://lawmentor.in/2022/03/14/abhilasha-v-parkash-2020-scc-online-sc-736/

Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala

This Case Summary is written by Pratyaksha Roy, a student at Army Institute of Law, Mohali

INTRODUCTION

The “Sabarimala Case” i.e., Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, is a landmark judgement pronouncing the exclusion of women in the age group of 10 to 50 years from worshipping in the Sabarimala temple as unconstitutional. The Constitutional bench struck down the age-old discriminatory practice by lifting the legal ban prohibiting women of menstruating age from worshipping in the famous Hindu temple.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

The Writ Petition in the present case was filed before the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India on behalf of six women, members of the Indian Young Lawyers’ Association, who sought the Court’s intervention to dismantle a ban on the entry of women aged 10 to 50 years into the Sabarimala temple on the ground that it violated their fundamental rights, particularly Articles 14, 15, 19, 21 and 25.

The case was taken up by a 5-judge bench compromising of the CJI Dipak Misra, Justices A.M. Khanwilkar, R.F. Nariman, D.Y. Chandrachud and Indu Malhotra.

This legal ban was initially in force by way of subordinate legislation in the form of successive notifications issued in 1955 and 1956, but was eventually given judicial recognition and protection as a “usage” by the Kerala High Court in the case of S. Mahendran v. Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board. 

JUDGEMENT

In the landmark judgement, the Bench unanimously (J. Indu Malhotra dissenting) decided in separate but concurring judgements to strike down the archaic exclusionary practice debarring women of procreative age from worshipping in the Sabarimala temple and declared it unconstitutional in nature and thereby, allowed the entry of women, irrespective of their age, into the temple on the grounds that the ban violated their fundamental right of Freedom of Religion guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution. 

Also, the provision restricting entry of women in the state legislation i.e., Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship Act, 1965 was declared ultra vires to Sections 3 and 4 of its parent Act, and was therefore, struck down and deemed unconstitutional. 

REASONING

The Respondents in the present case had submitted three major reasons in order to justify the continued exclusion of women from worshipping in the temple:

  • On the basis of menstruation-related pollution-

The exclusion of women in the present case was based upon a religious custom known as Vratham, which is a 41-day period of penance, involving the observance of purity of thought, word and deed by the devotee.

According to the respondents, women could not observe Vratham on the account of their monthly bleeding, which, according to them, is a period of bodily uncleanliness, and since no devotee was allowed to worship without having observed this ritual, therefore, menstruating women were not allowed to enter the temple and offer their prayers to the deity.

It is was held by the court that women too, could observe Vratham.

Menstruation did not mean that there was existence of sexual thoughts or presence of sexual activity; in fact, menstruation can be referred as the sole source of procreation.

  • On the basis of the celibate nature of the deity-

The deity residing in the Temple, i.e., Lord Ayyappa is in the form of Naishtika Brahmacharya, that means, he has taken the vow of celibacy.

Shri Swami Sivananda defines the true meaning of being a celibate or brahmacharya, which is, self-restraint, particularly, mastery or perfect control over the sexual organ or freedom from lust in thought, word and deed.

Therefore, merely being in the presence of women does not mean that the vow of celibacy will be broken, it would rather be said to be broken if the individual even so much as indulges himself in profane ideations, either in the presence or absence of women. The emphasis is on the restraint by the Brahmachari, rather than on the removal of all the temptations.

  • On the basis of the trek on the holy hills of Sabarimala-

It was argued that women cannot partake on the trek as it was strenuous in nature. To which, the Court rightfully enunciated that such a belief was “deeply rooted in a stereotypical (and constitutionally flawed) notion that women are the “weaker” sex.” Such an approach was therefore contrary to the constitutional guarantee of equality and dignity to women.

Regardless of the rationale that had been used for long to justify the interminable subjugation, oppression and exclusion of women devotees of Sabarimala from being able to freely practice their religious autonomy, it can inviolably be extrapolated that the practice was founded on beliefs surrounding misogyny, patriarchy and an overall perception of females being the weaker sex. 

ANALYSIS 

The following judgement shall be assessed thoroughly on three major parameters:

  1. Religious Denomination-

Article 26 of the Indian Constitution deals with the rights guaranteed to the religious denominations in our country. In order for a group or set of individuals to be called a ‘religious denomination’, it must satisfy three requirements

  • It must be collection of individuals who have a system of belief or doctrine which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being-

In order to constitute a religious denomination, there must be new methodology provided for a religion. It was held that the mere observance of certain distinctive practices, even though they might have been in usage from a long time, did not make it a distinct religion on that account. Since there was nothing on record to show that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa had any common religious tenets peculiar to themselves, which they regarded as conducive to their spiritual well-being, other than those which are common to the Hindu religion. Therefore, the devotees of Lord Ayyappa were pronounced to be Hindus and not a separate religious denomination.

  • It must be a common organisation-

The temple was dedicated to the public at large and represented truly, the plural character of society. Everyone, irrespective of religious belief, was allowed to worship the deity. The absence of a common spiritual organisation, which is a necessary element to constitute a religious denomination, was absent in the present case.

  • Designation of a distinctive name-

Although the respondents had tried to establish that the pilgrims coming to visit the Sabarimala temple, being devotees of Lord Ayyappa, were addressed as ‘Ayyappans’ and, thereby, the third condition in order to constitute a religious denomination was satisfied. However, this argument was outrightly rejected by the Court on the grounds that there was no officially recognized group called ‘Ayyappans’.

Since the collective of individuals were unable to satisfy the judicially-enunciated requirements to be declared as a religious denomination, therefore the devotees of Lord Ayyappa were held, as per majority, not to be a separate religious denomination and were thereby divested of their right to legally exclude women between the ages of 10 to 50 years from worshipping in the temple. Further, it was held that the temple’s denominational right to manage its own internal affairs, under Article 26(b), was now subject to the State’s social reform mandate under Article 25(2)(b). 

  1. Essential Practice-

Over the years, the Supreme Court has developed multiple criteria against which it decides what practices are ‘essential’ to various religions. In the Sabarimala temple case, the Court went on to declare that the exclusion of women was a non-essential practice based on the following grounds: 

  • For the want of textual and scriptural evidence in support of such a contention-

The unavailability of any texts, scriptures and doctrines acknowledging the exclusionary practice of prohibiting women from entering the temple certainly acted as an impediment to the court in the evaluation of the veracity of the exclusionary practice against such texts, scriptures, and doctrines. The Court thereby proceeded to examine whether the regulation or abolition of the practice in question would alter the ‘fundamental character’ of the religion itself.

Justices Dipak Misra and A.M. Khanwilkar very profoundly deduced that the exclusion of women from sacred spaces was not a fundamental part of Hinduism and held:

“In no scenario, it can be said that exclusion of women of any age group could be regarded as an essential practice of Hindu religion and on the contrary, it is an essential part of the Hindu religion to allow Hindu women to enter into a temple as devotees and followers of Hindu religion and offer their prayers to the deity.”

  • Such exclusion of women was an altered practice that had changed with time-

Another indispensable criterion involved in discerning the essentiality of the practice was ascertaining whether the practice was homogenous i.e., whether it was practiced by the entire religious community with perpetuity. However, in the present case it was admitted by the Respondents that “prior to the passing of the Notification in 1950, women of all age groups used to visit the Sabarimala Temple for the first rice feeding ceremony of their children.”

For any practice to be conceived as central to the pursuit of a religion, it must first be established that the said practice is unalterable as well as popular in nature; it is essential that both criteria are fulfilled. With respect to the restriction on the entry of women into places of worship, even though the practice was widespread and popular, it was dismissed as unessential since it had been altered. 

  • The practice violated the fundamental right of all women to practice religion-

Since menstruation was a process strictly exclusive to the female gender, thus discriminating on the basis of menstruation amounted to discrimination against all women thereby violating their fundamental right to practice religion. Women of any age group had as much right as men to visit and enter a temple in order to freely practice a religion, as guaranteed under Article 25(1).

It was against the basic constitutional values of dignity, liberty and equality-

While determining the essentiality of a practice, the courts examined whether by granting constitutional protection to the practice in question and by affixing it with the label of an ‘essential’ practice to the concerned religion, the Indian state’s vision of a society based on principles of equality, liberty and fraternity would be compromised. This further led to a debate on ‘Constitutional Morality’, which shall be discussed in the next point.

  1. Constitutional Morality-

The term ‘morality’ occurring in Article 25(1) of the Constitution in the present case was taken to mean ‘Constitutional Morality’.

Restricting the entry of women into a temple either on the ground that they menstruate or that their entry would inevitably cause deviation to the celibacy of the temple’s deity, violates the “internal morality” of the Constitution as it is a threat to the notion of equality and dignity underscored by the Constitution. Such a restriction can only be valid in a society where women are seen as innately lesser beings, who should not enjoy dignified lives. The Constitution lifts us away from such a society and pushes toward an equality that is both formal and substantive.

Moreover, one of the laudable findings made by Justice Chandrachud in the present case, is on ‘untouchability’. Adhering to usage in Article 17, untouchability of ‘all forms’, the judge deviated from the previous Supreme Court judgments that confined the concept of untouchability to caste-based exclusions and rather identified it with the notions of “purity and pollution” as the sustaining force of untouchability and found it to be against the tenets of dignity and constitutional morality. He held that Article 17 is a powerful guarantee against exclusion and cannot be read to exclude women against whom social exclusion of the worst kind had been practiced and legitimized on notions of “purity and pollution”.

CONCLUSION

The Sabarimala judgment was a watershed moment in the history of affirmative action as it greased the wheels of social integration and breathed life into feminist jurisprudence. The Supreme Court adopted a reformist and interventionist approach by upholding human dignity and equal entitlement to worship for all individuals.

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYEWR ASSOCIATION ORS. V. THE STATE OF KERALA ORS [W. P (CIVIL) 373 OF 2006]

This Case Summary is written by Anisha Ghosh, a student at Adamas University, Kolkata

“Worshiping goddess is necessary but giving equal treatment to women is mandatory”

SYNOPSIS

Although we live in 21st century but unfortunately our society’s thinking stands in 19th century. As a modern generation of this country we know that thinking has become more scientific and logical so we should not believing in myth. Society need to accept custom in a logical way. Through this case we can see that how court stands for reasonableness instead of myth and enlightened about to identifying which custom is morally right. We do have a constitution which ensures certain rights and duties so we cannot violets them because of some certain illogical customs. In ancient time India has always been a male dominating society now also in some rural area of India we witness a male dominating society. It is not about who dominate the society but it is all about for getting equal rights and equal treatment. 

BACK GROUND

 Constitution of India believes in gender equality, secularism and freedom but the harsh reality is women are always the victim of such customs and traditions. In India there is a temple, which is known as Sabrimala temple and it is situated at Kerala’s Pathanamthitta district. This temple is devoted to Lord Ayyappa where south Indian people worship him as a god of growth. They believed that prince of Pandalam dynasty was an avatar of Sastha who known as Manikandan and he medicated in the Sabrimala temple after that he known an avatar of lord Ayyappa. Section 4 of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Act, 1965 (for brevity, “the 1965 Act”) ensures that in the age of 10-50 years of age woman are not allow to entry in the temple. This kind of law arose many questions then a case was filed before the court for adjudication.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Lord Ayyappa is a celibacy god. In Sabrimala temple women cannot enter into the temple between the 10-50 years of age. Since ages this prohibitions had been practiced as a custom and usage.  A case was filed in the session court claiming that this custom and usage is unconstitutional and violets article 14 and article 25 of the Indian Constitution. Session court gave verdict that there is no valid reason which can justify this custom and usage and this customs is unconstitutional. In 1990, S Mahendran filed a plea in Kerala High Court seeking a ban on women prohibition of entry to the temple. But, Kerala High Court imposed the age-old restriction on women of a certain age-group entering the temple. On August 4, 2006, the Indian Young Lawyers Association filed a plea in the Supreme Court seeking to confirm entry of female devotees between the age group of 10 to 50 at the Lord Ayyappa Temple at Sabarimala.  

ISSUES

  1. Whether the practice of excluding women is an “essential religious practice” under Article 25 and Whether Ayyappa temple has a denomination character?

2. Whether Rule 3 of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship(Authorizing of Entry) based on biological factor women are not allow in the temple violets Articles 14&15(3) of the constitution?

3. Whether Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules,1965 is ultra vires to the provision of part III of the constitution?

CONTENTIONS

 The Petitioner contended, Hindu women are more idealizing than men so if there is any ban on entering into any temple then it would be anti-Hinduism. Puja ceremonies of Sabrimala temple signifies that it does not belong to any separate religion. It does not have any separate administration but this administration is administered under Cochin Hindu Religion Institution Act, 1950. Section (3b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Act 1965 has uses an expression that is ‘ at any time’. This expression does not properly expressing about prohibition on women’s entry but if any time specifically mentioned then that myth will continuing as a custom and usage so this Section (3b) is violated towards article 25(2) (b) of the constitution. In now days there are several customs exist which might not be right so court should take cognizance against that customs. If the rituals of Sabrimala does not come under ambit of religious denomination then it would come under ambit of article 12. If state would be prohibited from denying equal protection of law and state cannot discriminate on the basis of sex then it would be come under article 14 and 15. Article 51A(e) ensures ‘ dignity of women and it is an essential part of constitutional morality. Sabrimala is a denomination because rituals and customs of Sabrimala only protect under article 26(b).Women cannot practices Vrutham for 41 days because women would not abstinence from sexual activities and imposing restriction on women cannot be an essential aspect of Hindu religion. This kind of stereotype thinking stigmatizing women as a weaker character than men. 

In responses, the respondent contended that Lora Ayyappa is known as ‘hyper masculine God’ because according to our mythological book lord Ayyapppa born out from the two male divine gods, those are lord Shiva and Mohini but Mohini is a female form of god Vishnu. For doing worship of lord Ayyappa devotees need to follow ‘Vrutham’. This ritual is for spiritual purification. For practicing Vrutham, devotees need to be follow certain rules those are; wearing black cloths and not allow to cutting nails, cutting hair, shaving off facial hair. They must not to touch any woman including their wives and daughters for 41 days.  In the case of woman in between of 41 days they will have menstruation cycle then they will not follow it and it will be disrespectful for lord Ayyappa. This rule is not only applicable to woman, it is also applicable to men and this rule is not gender biased. This rule is not discriminatory in nature because it’s allows to entry every section of society including women but there are 2 criteria firstly, those who have not attain their puberty and secondly, those who are in menopause .According to the hindu customs when women are during their menstruation cycle they are not allowed to worship and also they cannot go to the temple. Under section 3(b) of Kerala Hindu Places of Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules, 1965 have some restrictions and if those restrictions are allowed to operate only for 60 days then this section will not violets article 14,15 and 17 of the constitution and also will not fall under the purview of article 25 and 26 of constitution. 

FINDINGS

 The notions of public order, morality and health cannot be used as a device to limit the freedom to freely practice religion and by denying women religious rights to enter into the Sabrimala temple, it discriminatory under Article 25.Thinking that women are impure and this kind of mentality build a barrier of untouchability so it also violets Article 17.  Section 3 and Section 4(1) of the 1965 Act clearly specify that custom and usage must make space to the rights of all sections and classes of Hindus who wants to offer prayers at places of public worship and any interpretation would contrary to the purpose of 1965 act. Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules is ultra vires to the Article 15(1). According to former J. Indu Malhotra Sabrimala temple is a religious denomination so it is not violates Article 25.

REASONING

In a 4:1 majority the court held that not to allow women in the temple is violated under Article 25(1) because our constitution gave equal right to everyone to practices their religion. Article 14  violated because a certain age group of women are ban to entry into the temple and rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Act, 1965 was ultra-virus to constitutional being violated of Article 25(1) and Article 12(1) of the Constitution of India.

DISPOSITION

In this case the Supreme Court of India allowed the writ petition and removed the ban on women entering into temple and also declared rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Act, 1965 unconstitutional.

CRITICALANALYSIS

According to Quran it is clearly mentioned that women are always impure because they have their menstruation cycle and they should not enter into the mosque. According to Bible menstruation cycle is a disease and also according to Gita, women have their menstruation cycle because this is curse given by lord Indro so during menstruation cycle women should not be allow to worship. This codified holy books are from ancient period but now we live in 21st century and we know that everything has some reason. Science has told us that without reasoning we should not believe in anything and according to Medical science menstruation cycle is a normal body process it is as normal as having food or water. Without this process a women cannot have a child, it is so important for every women in the world. In the landmark case of Sabrimala, five bench of judges was set up for giving judgement in this case. The judgement was delivered with the 4:1 majority. Unfortunately there was a judge who gave a dissenting opinion and that judge told that we should not interfere in the matter of customs and usage. If we would not interfere in the matter of old customs and usage then how we would remove ill-practice customs. In the previous times judiciary removed unnecessary customs such as triple talaq, dowry and sati. A review petition was filed in the year of 2019 on the basis of that Sabrimala temple is a separate religious denomination but that review petition was rejected. Court only have a power to remove the cruel customs but it is a duty to a every individual to stop this kinds of customs and this is a only path of saving the modern India. It is just a start for removing old customs which is not morally correct and there is a long path to go. 

CONCLUSION

In ancient times,  some rules were set by the society or any other person who was powerful like Brahmans, king at that time. We know very well about Chanakya, one of the best jurist in India. He told about women that ‘‘when women attain their puberty they should be control under her father, when she would be adult then she should be control under her husband and when she would be getting old then she should be control under her son’’. He also told that women should never be set free throughout their lifetime they should always be under the control of a man. After so many decades our society has remain patriarchy society and now also women did not get their equal right as man but for this we cannot only blame the men solely because to some extent there is also fault of women. This discriminatory rituals are still followed by women and then they carry forward to their next generation. After the Sabrimala judgement many women are against this judgement because they also think women are impure at the time of menstruation cycle but according to Medical science menstruation cycle is a natural process and it makes every women complete. We Indians feel proud about our customs and culture and we worship goddess yet we think during menstruation cycle women are not clean and they are impure. According to National Statistical office survey, Kerala has 96.2% literacy rate and if literate peoples in India is believing in such kind of baseless customs then it would be very hard to change people’s mindset in India. Indian judiciary take steps for our society so that we will not blindly believe in any unnecessary customs that will violets our constitutional rights, Customs are only valid till when it will not hurt others rights.