Tag Archives: Case Summary

Assistant Manager (Legal) at Rajasthan Financial Corporation: Apply by Jan 28

About Rajasthan Financial Corporation

Rajasthan Financial Corporation (RFC) is an undertaking Department of Government of Rajasthan established in 1955 under the SFCs Act, 1951.

It helps the State/Central Government by implementing its various schemes/ policies for the entrepreneurs. It provides financial assistance to promote micro, small and medium scale industries in Rajasthan.

About the Job

Rajasthan Financial Corporation invites online application for the post of Assistant Manager (Law).

Name of the Post: Assistant Manager (Law)

Eligibility

  • Age Limit: 21-40 Years
  • LL.B. first class (60% marks) bachelor’s degree in law (professional) Note: For Reserve Category (SC/ST only) Candidates a minimum of 50% marks in law degree (Professional) would be necessary & Basic Computer proficiency; Or
  • LLM from recognized Institute / University & Basic Computer proficiency.
  • Minimum two years’ experience in Govt. undertaking/industrial undertaking/Financial Institution on a responsible position. Or Three years practice in BAR.

Salary

Remuneration: Rs. 31,100/-

Last Date To Apply

The last date to submit the online application is 28.01.2026

Application Procedure

Click Here To Apply.

The Official Notification is here.

UPSC | Examiner Of Trade Marks & Geographical Indications at Office of the Controller General of Patents, Designs & Trade Marks [100 Seats]: Apply by Jan 1

Union Public Service Commission invites online applications for the 100 posts of Examiner of Trade Marks & Geographical Indications. These positions are in the Office of the Controller General of Patents, Designs & Trade Marks. The positions are under the Department of Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

Essential Qualification and Experience

Degree in law of a recognized University.

Two years’ experience in handling Court cases and other legal matters or in handling matters of Trade marks and Geographical Indications.

Desirable: Master’s Degree in Intellectual Property of a recognized University.

Name of the Post

Examiner of Trade Marks & Geographical Indications

No. of Posts

100

Duties

The examiner of Trade Marks & Geographical Indications performs statutory quasi-judicial  functions under the specific intellectual property legislation. As such, under the superintendence and directions of the Registrar, he examines the applications and considers any response filed thereto as per law. Further, as per direction of the Registrar, he also performs any other incidental administrative or quasi-judicial functions.

Deadline

The last date to submit the online application is 01.01.2026

Headquarter

New Delhi

Application Procedure

Click Here to Apply.

The official notification is here.

9th National Case Comment Writing Competition Organised by Team Attorneylex: Register by 11th September

About the Organisation:

Team Attorneylex is an online platform for law students where they can contribute their legal knowledge and get recognised for their contribution. Along with the other activities, the endeavour is to deliver legal help to the sectors of society that are unable to access existing legal services due to illiteracy and poor economic conditions.

About the Competition:

The objective of this competition is to promote the importance of the latest landmark judgment passed by the Supreme Court of India. This competition will let the participants know how these latest judgments have changed the overall course of justice. The Supreme Court landmark judgments provided as the theme of the Competition would enrich not only the academic experience but also provide knowledge about the practical aspect of the professional legal world. This Case Comment Writing Competition promotes original thoughts and analysis among students, researchers, academicians and legal practitioners.

 Eligibility Criteria:

  • Open to All.
  • All undergraduate and postgraduate students, teachers, and research scholars from a recognized school, college or university are eligible to participate in this competition.

List of Cases for Case Comment Writing ( Choose any one)

  1. Government of NCT of Delhi vs Union Of India 23 SCC OnLine SC 606 
  2. Mohd. Ahmad Khan vs Shah Bano Begum & Ors. (1985)
  3. Union of India vs Alapan Bandyopadhyay (2022 SCC Online SC 16)
  4. Neil Aurelio Nunes vs Union of India (2022 SCC Online 75)
  5. Ashish Shelar vs Maharastra Legislative Assembly (2022 SCC Online 105)
  6. Jarnail Singh vs Lachhmi Narain Gupta (2022 SCC Online 96)
  7. State of Manipur vs Surajakumar (2022 SCC Online SC 130)
  8. Hotel Priya, A Proprietorship vs State of Maharashtra (2022 SCC Online SC 204)
  9. Vijay Mandal Choudhary vs Union of India (2022 SCC Online SC 881)
  10. Jacob Puliyel vs Union of India (2022 SCC Online SC 533)

Submission Guidelines:

  • The case comment should include the following elements: Synopsis, background, facts of the case, issues, contentions, findings, reasoning, disposition, critical analysis, and conclusion.
  • The submission must be original. 
  • Submission must be in English Language only.
  • It should be submitted in Word/ Docs document format only.
  • Word Limit: 1200-2400 words, including citations.
  • Plagiarism limit: 20%. 
  • Co-authorship is permitted( Max. 2 Authors)
  • Formatting Details:
  1. Font: Times New Roman
  2. Title: Font Size – 14, Bold, Underlined, Capital
  3. Headings: Font Size – 14, Bold, Capital
  4. Content: Font Size – 12
  5. Alignment: Justified
  6. Line Spacing: 1.5
  7. Citation: Endnote (20th Blue Book)
  • All submissions shall be made to submission@teamattorneylex.in with the subject – “Submission: National Case Comment Writing Competition”.

Note: The submission shall also be accompanied by another Word document consisting of a Cover Letter mentioning the Name of the Author/s; Name of the Institution/College/University; Designation; Year of Study (if applicable); Email ID.

Marks Shall be allotted based on the following:

  1. Understanding of the Facts of the Case (Topic chosen)
  2. Interpretation
  3. Analysis and Conclusion
  4. Presentation and Creativity
  5. Compliance & Strict Adherence to formatting and submission guidelines

Important Dates and Timing: 

  1. Last Date of Registration: 11 September 2023
  2. Last Date of Submission: 15  September, 11:59 PM.
  3. Declaration of Results: 20 September 2023

Prizes:

  • Winner: Cash prize Rs. 3000/- + Certificate of Merit + Free Article/ Case Summary publication on the website + Online Internship opportunity with the Team Attorneylex.
  • Runner up: Cash prize Rs. 2000/- + Certificate of Merit + Free Article/ Case Summary publication on the website  + Online Internship Opportunity with Team Attorneylex.
  • 2nd Runner Up: Cash prize Rs. 1000/- + Certificate of Merit + Free Article/ Case Summary publication on the website + Online Internship Opportunity with Team Attorneylex.
  • Top 10 Performers: Certificate of Merit + Free Article/ Case Summary publication on the website.
  • E–Participation Certificates will be provided to all the participants.

Registration Fee:

Single Author: Rs. 150/- (Early bird offer Rs. 120, till 20th August)

Two Authors: Rs. 200/- (Early bird offer Rs. 170, till 20th August)

Payments details

Paytm/ G-pay/Phonepe- 9616696008 (Gaurav yadav)

Bhim UPI- 9616696008@upi

Bank details-

Name- Gaurav Yadav

Bank – HDFC Bank

Account Number- 50100429858721

IFSC Code- HDFC0009157

Registration Link

Click here to register,

Or 

https://forms.gle/15y7HMuXK1Xuyq4H6

If you have any queries feel free to contact

Pragati Singh: 9793539034

Gaurav Yadav: 9616696008

Email- contact@teamattorneylex.in

For More Such Opportunities, Join Team Attorneylex’s WhatsApp group to get notified immediately. Also, check us out on Instagram and Twitter

7th National Case Comment Writing Competition Organised by Team Attorneylex: Register by 30th March

About the Organisation:

Team Attorneylex is a Student-run organisation; it is an online platform for law students where they can contribute their legal knowledge and get recognised for their contribution. 

Along with the other activities, the endeavour is to deliver legal help to the sectors of society that are unable to access existing legal services due to illiteracy and poor economic conditions.

About the Competition:

The objective of this competition is to promote the importance of the latest landmark judgment passed by the Supreme Court of India. This competition will let the participants know how these latest judgments have changed the overall course of justice. The Supreme Court landmark judgments provided as the theme of the Competition would enrich not only the academic experience but also provide knowledge about the practical aspect of the professional legal world. This Case Comment Writing Competition promotes original thoughts and analysis among students, researchers, academicians and legal practitioners.

 Eligibility Criteria:

  • Open to All.
  • All undergraduate and postgraduate students, teachers, research scholars from a recognized school, college or university are eligible to participate in this competition.

List of Cases for Case Comment Writing ( Choose any one)

  1. RIT Foundation vs Union of India (2022 SCC Online Del 1404)
  2. Janhit Abhiyan vs Union of India (2022 SCC Online SC 1540)
  3. Union of India vs Alapan Bandyopadhyay (2022 SCC Online SC 16)
  4. Neil Aurelio Nunes vs Union of India (2022 SCC Online 75)
  5. Ashish Shelar vs Maharastra Legislative Assembly (2022 SCC Online 105)
  6. M. Siddiq vs Mahant Suresh Das (2019 SCC Online 1440)
  7. Jarnail Singh vs Lachhmi Narain Gupta (2022 SCC Online 96)
  8. State of Manipur vs Surajakumar (2022 SCC Online SC 130)
  9. Hotel Priya, A Proprietorship vs State of Maharashtra (2022 SCC Online SC 204)
  10. Vijay Mandal Choudhary vs Union of India (2022 SCC Online SC 881)
  11. Jacob Puliyel vs Union of India (2022 SCC Online SC 533)
  12. State of Jharkhand vs Shailendra Kumar Rai (2022 SCC Online SC 1494)

Submission Guidelines:

  • The case comment should include the following elements: Synopsis, background, facts of the case, issues, contentions, findings, reasoning, disposition, critical analysis, and conclusion.
  • The submission must be original. 
  • Submission must be in English Language only.
  • It should be submitted in Word/ Docs document format only.
  • Word Limit: 1200-2400 words, including citations.
  • Plagiarism limit: 25%. 
  • Co-authorship is permitted( Max. 2 Authors)
  • Formatting Details:
  1. Font: Times New Roman
  2. Title: Font Size – 14, Bold, Underlined, Capital
  3. Headings: Font Size – 14, Bold, Capital
  4. Content: Font Size – 12
  5. Alignment: Justified
  6. Line Spacing: 1.5
  7. Citation: Endnote (20th Blue Book)
  • All submissions shall be made to submission@teamattorneylex.in with the subject – “Submission: National Case Comment Writing Competition”.

Note: The submission shall also be accompanied by another Word document consisting of a Cover Letter mentioning the Name of the Author/s; Name of the Institution/College/University; Designation; Year of Study (if applicable); Email ID.

Marks Shall be allotted based on the following:

  1. Understanding of the Facts of the Case (Topic chosen)
  2. Interpretation
  3. Analysis and Conclusion
  4. Presentation and Creativity
  5. Compliance & Strict Adherence to formatting and submission guidelines

Important Dates and Timing: 

  1. Last Date of Registration: 30 March 2023
  2. Last Date of Submission: 1 April 2023, 11:59 PM.
  3. Declaration of Results: 5 April 2023

Prizes:

  • Winner: Cash prize Rs. 3000/- + Certificate of Merit + Free Article/ Case Summary publication on the website + Online Internship opportunity with the Team Attorneylex.
  • Runner up: Cash prize Rs. 1500/- + Certificate of Merit + Free Article/ Case Summary publication on the website  + Online Internship Opportunity with Team Attorneylex.
  • 2nd Runner Up: Cash prize Rs. 700/- + Certificate of Merit + Free Article/ Case Summary publication on the website + Online Internship Opportunity with Team Attorneylex.
  • Top 10 Performers: Certificate of Merit + Free Article/ Case Summary publication on the website + Online Internship Opportunity with Team Attorneylex.
  • E–participation Certificate will be provided to all the participants.

Registration Fee:

Single Author: Rs. 100/- (Early bird offer Rs. 80, till 10th March)

Two Authors: Rs. 150/- (Early bird offer Rs. 130, till 10th March)

Payments details

Paytm/ G-pay/Phonepe- 9616696008 (Gaurav yadav)

Bhim UPI- 9616696008@upi

Bank details-

Name- Gaurav Yadav

Bank – HDFC Bank

Account Number- 50100429858721

IFSC Code- HDFC0009157

Registration Link

Click here to register,

Or 

https://forms.gle/dVyyanDDkj2tySV59

If you have any queries feel free to contact

Pragati Singh: 9793539034

Gaurav Yadav: 09616696008

Email- contact@teamattorneylex.in

For More Such Opportunities, Join Team Attorneylex’s WhatsApp group to get notified immediately. Also, check us out on Instagram and Twitter

Sansar Chand v State of Rajasthan, 2010 (10) SCC 604

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This Case Summary is written by Shrasti Singh, a student of Shri Ramswaroop Memorial University, Lucknow

Introduction

India is well known for its diverse flora and fauna. But over the decades, due to illegal trade, hunting, poaching and export of the animals led to rapid decline of India’s wild animals and bird and some of them are extinct, which is cause of main concern. In order to maintain the ecological balance in the environment and sustaining the ecological chain, we have to preserve and protect the wildlife as they are interlinked in nature.

The Constitution of India 1950 also provide the provision related to wildlife protection-

Under the directive principle of state policy, the state have obligation to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and wildlife of the country. (Article 48A)

Every citizen of India have the fundamental duty to protect and improve the natural environment including the wildlife provided under Article 51A (g) of Constitution.

The parliament, in order to fulfill the constitutional purpose, had passed a wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 with an aim to protect the country’s wild animals, birds, and plant species, in order to ensure environmental and ecological security. It prohibit hunting of wild animal and also prohibit the trade or commerce in wild animals, animals’ articles and trophies. The violation of this act is treated as a criminal offence and the punishment is given under section 51 and the property which is derived from illegal hunting and trade is liable to forfeiture.

Further, India is signatory to the UN Convention on International Trade In Endangered Species and UN convention against Transnational organized Crime which protect the endangered species and punish the wrongdoer who are involved in illegal trading and poaching etc. According to latest all India survey by the Wildlife Institute of India, there were about 1411 tigers left in India in 2008. 

The above case is a landmark case of wildlife protection act 1972. This case is a criminal Appeal. It is judged by two bench at the supreme court of India by the Honorable Mr. Justice Markandey Katju and Mr. Justice T.S. Thakur. 

Fact of the Case

In 2010, the Mascot of Commonwealth Game was SHERA, a tiger which is rare to found in today’s times as a result of organized crimes of human like poaching that have pushed wildlife to the stage of extinction and such issue is highlighted in this case. 

The appellant (Sansar Chand) had a long history regarding his wildlife crime. He had started the wildlife crime from the age of 16 in 1974. He was arrested for having 680 skins of different wild animals. He also arrested for involving in the activities of poaching, illegal trade of tiger, leopard and skins of other animals and further the appellant along with his gang started a smuggling network in which they send the tiger and leopard’s part and skins outside the Indian Border, especially China. He along with his gang had been booked for 57 wildlife case from year 1964-2005.

 In this case, a Balwan was arrested by police in train for having a carton containing leopard’s skin on January 5, 2003. Balwan made disclosure statement to SHO, Bhilwara that the two leopard skins were for the appellant Sanskar Chand. The appellant was arrested and during trial, he was convicted by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (Railways), Ajmer, Rajasthan on April 29, 2004. 

The appellant then filed an appeal against the decree to the Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Cases, who upheld the conviction of the appellant and dismiss the appeal on 19.8.2006. Thereafter, the petitioner filed the Revision Petition in the Rajasthan High Court who also dismissed the petition. Thus, all the above courts found the appellant guilty of the offences charged. Thus the present appeal was filed before the Supreme Court. 

The appellant’s contention in the present case was that the above judgement was solely based on the extra-judicial confession made by co-accused Balwan. And the evidence of extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence. Thus no conviction should be solely based on it. 

Issues Raised in appeal

  • Whether the conviction of the appellant under the wildlife (Protection) Act is justified or not?
  • Whether the conviction is solely based on the extra judicial confession or not?

 Judgement

The Supreme Court have granted the leave to hear the appeal.  The court examined the evidence  of prosecution, oral as well documentary given in the three above court and gave his judgement.

The prosecution’s contention was that the extra judicial confession of accused Balwan was written by Arvind who have neither any friendship nor enmity with the accused Balwan. Arvind had also made disposition in the court that he had written the fact in confession as dictated by accused in custody and accused Balwan agreed on it by putting thumb impression on each pages. 

Accused Balwan made this extra judicial confession when he was remanded to judicial custody. Thus, confession can be held to be not made under undue influence, fear or inducement of the Police. In confession, he told address of the accused, he confessed about the money Rs 5000/- and Rs 10,000/- paid by the appellant. And gave information about appellant properties purchased in Delhi in name of him and his wife’s name with the money he made out of his illegal activities stated above.

 During investigation, Investigation officer on the basis of the information given by Balwan under Sections 27 Evidence Act had recovered the Knife, capped gun, iron funda, nails of Panthers Paw’s and bones of killed Panthers from the accused house and properties have been found in the name of Sansar Chand. Thus, this extra-judicial confession of the co-accused has been corroborated from the recoveries made in pursuance of the same, the previous conviction of the petitioner by this Hon’ble Court and the number of pending cases showed him as a habitual wild life trader. 

The court also refer the precedent given below for extra-judicial confession- 

  1. Thimma vs. the State of Mysore, in this court held that there is no absolute rule that an extra judicial confession can be basis of a conviction, although ordinarily an extra judicial confession should be corroborated by some other evidence.
  2. Piara Singh vs. State of Punjab, it has been held that the law does not require that evidence of an extra-judicial confession should in all cases be corroborated.
  3. Shiva Karam Payaswami Tewar vs State of Maharashtra (In The extra judicial confession, the court has to satisfy itself that the confession was voluntary and without any coercion and undue influence.)

In the present case, there are concurrent findings of facts of three courts that the extra-judicial confession made by co-accused Balwan to Arvind Kumar (a fellow prisoner) was voluntary, reliable and trustworthy under Section 24 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, the conviction of the petitioner can be based on the extra-judicial confession of Balwan and the other corroborative evidence on record.

Verdict of the Court

 After examining the evidence, The Supreme Court dismissed an appeal and upheld the decision of the High Court who have affirmed the decision of the learned Magistrate and the Special Judge regarding the conviction of the appellant. Further the court also requested to the Central and State Government and their agencies to make all effort to preserve and protect the wild life of the country and take strict action against those who are violating the provision of the wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court in this case had realized the importance or need for the protection of wildlife as this is very necessary for maintaining the ecological balance in the country. And required to punished the person who violates any section of wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972.

Critical Analysis

This case is a historic judgment in the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 in which poaching, illegal hunting and illegal trading of wild animal is prohibited and person is severely punished for such offences. In this case, Sansar Chand was convicted for above wildlife crime. In my view, the judgement written by Supreme Court judge Markandey Katju is in the favor of the justice as he affirmed the conviction of appellant who involved in wildlife crime from early age of 16 from the year 1974 to 2005. This case set an example to punish a people who get involved directly or indirectly in such activities, under Wildlife Protection Act, 1972. 

http://leagalworld.in/2022/09/15/sansar-chand-v-state-of-rajasthan-2010-10-scc-604/

Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug V. Union Of India (2011) 4 SCC 454

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This Case Summary is written by Arfa Aslam Khan, a student at School of law, University of Kashmir 

SYNOPSIS

The case of Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug is one of the most famous and intriguing cases in the Indian judicial history which legalized passive euthanasia and recognized that an individual has a ‘right to die with dignity’ and this right comes within the ambit of ‘right to life ‘ guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Passive euthanasia refers to the withdrawal of medical treatment with the deliberate intention to hasten the death of a terminally ill patient and thereby relieving him of the pain and agony of living live that is meaningless. 

BACKGROUND

The case strengthened the demand fro a sensible law on passive euthanasia and assisted suicide. Till that time the courts in India had on various occasions tried to dodge the issue. This case posed a series of uncomfortable questions to the people as a society which had till thet time been perceived just as medico legal issues. As of now only four European countries (Switzerland, Belgium, Netherlands, & Luxembourg) allow fro assisted suicide, where patients are given lethal doses of killer drugs to end their lives. In the present case the Supreme Court upheld the validity of passive euthanasia but denied assisted suicide by the administration of fatal injections. The case was a reminder that India can no longer afford to put the issue off the back burner.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The case reached the Supreme Court by a petition filed by Ms Pinki Virani claiming to be the next friend of the petitioner Aruna Shanbaug. Aruna was a nurse working at King Edward Memorial (KEM) Hospital, Mumbai. She was sexually assaulted on the night of 27th November, 1973 by a sweeper of the same hospital namely Sohanlal who attacked her with an intention to rape her. During the attack, Shanbaug was strangled with a dog chain while she was being sodomized. To immobilize her during the brutal act, he twisted the chain around her neck which led to the deprivation of the oxygen supply to her brain. On the following day she was found lying in a pool of blood by the cleaner of the hospital. She was treated at KEM Hospital following the incident where she remained in a permanent vegetative state (PVS) until her death of pneumonia in 2015. During the course of these years she was force-fed by a feeding tube to keep her alive. 

ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT

The following were the issues before the Supreme Court:

  1. Whether the withdrawal of life support for a person who is in permanent vegetative state (PVS) is lawful/ permissible?
  2. Should a living will of patient be respected in such situations?
  3. Does the family or next of the kin of a person have a right to make a request to withdraw life supporting system in case a person himself has not made such a request previously?

CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER

The journalist-activist Pinki Virani on behalf of the petitioner asked for the legalization of euthanasia so that Aruna’s continued sufferings could be brought to an end by withdrawal of medical support. Her contention was that Aruna had no chance of recovery as she had been in the permanent vegetative state (PVS) for decades & thus she should be relieved of her pain and agony.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

Responding to the petition filed by Pinki Virani, the respondent aprties i.e. KEM Hospital & Bombay Municipal Corporation filed a counter petition opposing euthanasia for Aruna Shanbaug. Aruna had a long association with the nurses of KEM Hospital. They had been taking good care of her & were happy to do so for the remaining days of her life. They believed that allowing euthanasia for Aruna would put all their efforts into drain. 

FINDINGS OF THE COURT 

The Supreme Court in order to have a better understanding of the whole situation constituted a team of 3 eminent doctors to report on the physical and mental condition of Aruna Shanbaug. After examining her, the appointed doctors’ team concluded that Aruna was neither brain dead nor in coma. She could respond to external stimuli, had feelings and was able to breathe without the support machine. Her condition was quite stable. She was in a permanent vegetative state (PVS)-a condition of unawareness of self and surroundings. She survived on mashed food poured directly into her stomach through a nasal pipe and the hospital authorities were taking good care of her and therefore there was no need to end her life. 

The Supreme Court was put in a very difficult situation to decide the constitutionality of passive euthanasia. The court allowed passive euthanasia in certain conditions, subject to the approval of the High Court. It was held that whenever an application is filed in the High Court for passive euthanasia the Chief Justice of the High Court would constitute a 2 judge bench to decide the matter whether or not such termination should be granted. The2 judge bench had to seek the opinion of a committee of three reputed doctors nominated by it after consultation of the medical authorities and practitioners required for the purpose.. 

The court however keeping all the facts in mind denied Aruna Shanbaug euthanasia. The court however left it open for the hospital staff at any time to approach the HC under the prescribed rules in case they felt a need for the same.

Further the court found that in the present case the next of the kin of the patient would be the KEM hospital that has been taking care of her since the incident and not Pinki Virani and therefore any right to take any decision on her behalf was vested in the hospital. 

REASONING OF THE COURT

The Court while delivering the judgment distinguished between active and passive euthanasia. It observed that causing the death of a person who is in ‘persistent vegetative state’ with no chance of recovery, by withdrawing artificial life support is not a” positive act of killing” which couldn’t be allowed considering the facts of each case. The withdrawal of life support by doctors is considered as an omission & not a positive step to terminate life. 

The Supreme Court had to deal with another issue & that was the constitutionality of Section 309 I.P.C. Section 309of Indian Penal Code is a penal provision that provides punishment for an attempt to commit suicide. In the Bombay High Court struck down Section 309 of I.P.C and held that it was ultra-vires of Article 19 & 21. The court further opined that “right to life includes the right to live as well as right to end one’s life if one so desires.”

In the case of the Supreme Court held Section 309 I.P.C to be violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. The court held that this provision needs to be effaced from the statute book as “it is a cruel & irrational provision & may result in punishing a person doubly who has suffered agony & would be undergoing ignominy because of his failed attempt to end his life.” The court also remarked that life under Article 21 includes the right to live with human dignity and not mere material existence in person.

However in the five-judge Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held Section 306 &309 of IPC to be constitutionally valid and observed that right to life doesn’t include right to die. it was in this case that the court held that the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 doesn’t include right to die.

Aruna Shanbaug was denied euthanasia because the court held that ‘right to die with dignity at the end of life is not to be equated with the right to die an unnatural death by curtailing the natural span of life’. The Supreme Court, however, affirmed that in a case of a dying person or a person who is terminally ill or in PVS he may be permitted to terminate it by a premature extinction of his life in these circumstances and is not a crime keeping in view the Gian kaur’s case

DISPOSITION AND THE POSITION AHEAD

The judgment was passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench of the Supreme Court of India consisting of Justice Markandey Katju and Justice Gyan Sudha Mishra. Interestingly articulated by Justice Markandey Katju was a couplet of Mirza Ghalib 

Marte hain aarzoo main marne ki 

Maut aati hai phr bhi nahi aati”

In 2014, Aruna Shanbaug’s judgment was termed inconsistent by a three judge bench of the Supreme Court & the issue of euthanasia was referred to its five-judge Constitution Bench. 

In the case of the Constitution Bench led by the then Chief Justice of India Dipak Misra upheld that the fundamental right to life and dignity includes “right to refuse treatment and die with dignity.” The court further observed that the key to meaningful existence vested in the individual’s freedom to choose to die with dignity

The concept of living wills was also solidified in this judgment. The Court held that advance medical directives (living wills) would be quite fruitful to facilitate the fructification of the sacrosanct right to live with dignity. The Constitution Bench viewed that the said directive would dispel any doubt at the relevant time of need during the course of treatment of the patient. The Supreme Court in this judgment aid down a detailed procedure for the execution of living wills which is quite cumbersome, tedious and not easy to adhere to. However this judgment was a good beginning to address a new concept which was not touched in the past.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

At the outset, the judgment fails to address many serious issues. The first being that it altogether ignores that in Aruna Shanbaug’s case the “right to live” was a privilege. She was a privileged nurse to be receiving this treatment while others facing a disease far worse than her would have long ago died. The Court chose to remain silent on an issue which was likely to become extremely vexatious in the times to come.

A serious question is raised that ‘Can one person be allowed to block a bed for 37 odd years & thus deprive other patients of medical treatment which could save their lives, in country like India which lacks the basic medical infrastructure & a proper medicare?”

It is but evident that had Aruna not been a nurse of KEM Hospital she would not have been looked after and cared for like this.

Ordinarily it is a general convention worldwide that beds are reserved fro patients whose ailments can be addressed and cured, whether totally or partially. Hospitals are in no case residence of the patients. Judiciary ought to have put its emotional reactions aside because it taints the judicial process. Also providing treatment to patients in an incurable condition just because they are they are privileged is dangerous as well as discriminatory and also drains the state of ist resources.

Second, the judgment gave a legal sanction to passive euthanasia although it was always practiced behind closed doors and thus the facade of laying down a legal procedure hardly serves any purpose.

Generally when a patient is terminally ill it is recommended by the family doctors that the patient be kept at home at given treatment there so that he can die in the least painful manner and this approach is very much sensible and humanitarian. 

Also the Court expects that in each application for euthanasia the petitioners should approach the respective High Court. However no sane family would approach Courts and wait for years to get Court’s ratification. This has thus rendered this judgment unfructuous. 

Third, on one hand the Court recognizes attempt to suicide under Section 309 I.P.C as punitive but on the other hand that a patient has a right to refuse treatment even if this results in cutting short his life span. This is so bizarre.

Fourth, even in cases where a person dies of starvation, it is invariably stated in the death certificate that the person died of natural cause. 

It is the responsibility of the State to provide and fulfill the Right to life. Thus when a State fails to perform its responsibility, shouldn’t the officer and govt. officers be held accountable under Section 306 I.P.C (abetment to suicide) for allowing the person to die?

CONCLUSION

Although the Supreme Court embarked upon the cumbersome journey to minimize the chances of misuse of euthanasia, however, there is a highly dangerous aspect that its abuse may be easily made undetectable. Although euthanasia appears to be morally justifiable, but its fool-proof applicability is close to impossible. India needs the maturity top handle the issue & to understand its pros and cons thoroughly. There is a need to take the recommendations laid down by the Law Commission into consideration and frame a law to prevent malpractices and its misuse.

THE SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE v. BABITA PUNIYA & Ors (2020 SCC ONLINE 200)

This Case Summary is written by Ritika Srivastava, a student at The ICFAI University, Dehradun

SYNOPSIS

The Constitution of India enumerates various provisions for women for their upliftment and to bring gender equality in the society. But it is still a question whether women are treated equally on par with men after 74 years of Independence. The answer is NO. India being one the largest democracy but Gender stereotypes always creates obstacles in the path of women. There is several of gender discrimination from which women are fighting since birth till the date of their death, they are bound in such stereotype but one of the battles ended in the favour of them in the Supreme Court’s landmark judgment namely “The Secretary, Ministry of Defence v. Babita Puniya & Ors. The honourable court ordered to grant Permanent Commission (PC) in 10 non-combat services at three month and further stated that women are now eligible to hold command posts by tire the existing ceiling. This judgment gives women an equal opportunity in the Indian Army by providing them a long-term job security.

BACKGROUND

Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950 defined the Ineligibility of females for enrolment or employment. It says that “No female shall be eligible for enrolment or employment in the regular Army, except in such cops, department, branches or other body forming part of, or attached to any portion of, the regular Army as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf:

Provided that nothing contained in this section shall affect the provision of any law for the time being in force providing for the raising and maintenance of any service auxiliary to the regular Army or any branch thereof in which females are eligible for enrolment or employment”.

On 30th January 1992, a notice issued by the Union government in favour of female candidates that they are granted Short Service Commissions (SSC) for five year for the department such as Army Postal Service, Judge Advocate General’s Department, Army Education Corps, Army Ordinance Corps and Service Corps. And after few months in a same year on 31st December, five more department such as Mechanical, Signal and Electrical engineering, Engineers, Regiment of Artillery and Intelligence Corps.

FACTS OF THE CASE

In the year 2003, Babita Puniya, an advocate filed a writ petition in the nature of PIL before the Delhi High Court for granting Permanent Commission (PC) to military women who recruited as Short Service Commission (SSC) officers. And apart from this petition, many other petitions were filed by the women officers for the same and tagged their petition with Babita’s petition.

In the year 2005, the Minister of Defence declared that validity of the appointment scheme of the Indian Army regarding women officers being extended.

On 20th July 2006, a further notification issued which allows the SSC women officers to serve for maximum 14 years. In a same year on 16th October, Major Leena Gaurav again filed a writ petition challenging the terms and conditions issued by the Minister of Defence on 20th July for seeking to grant Permanent Commission (PC) for Women officers. In the next year (2007) Lt. Colonel Seema Singh also filed petition for the same issue of granting PC.

In the year 2008, the Union Government granted PC to SSC officers in some of the departments such as in JAG and Army Education Corps. Later, Major Sandhya Yadav and others challenged this notification that PC was granted to those who appointed after the date of implementation of this notification and only in two departments.

Delhi High Court flooded with the petition seeking to grant PC to the women officers. In 12th March 2010, Delhi High Court heard all the petition and held that PC should be granted to the women who were already recruited as SSC in all departments after five years of service. In July the Army appeared before the Supreme Court challenging this judgment but Supreme Court upheld the judgment of Delhi High Court.

On 2nd September 2011, again appeal was made in Supreme Court which held the given judgment to be continued. In 2018, the court was asked to review the order of granting PC to women in the Army.

At last on 15th February 2019, the Union Government issued a notification for PC to SSC women in the Army of eight combat support services and women officers were only serve on staff appointments. 

ISSUES RAISED

  • Whether the order issue by the Centre on 15th February 2019 should be implemented?
  • Whether women in the Indian Army should be granted Permanent Commission (PC)?
  • What are the terms and conditions determine the Women officers in the Indian Army?

CONTENTIONS

The argument advanced by the Petitioner

  1. It was argued that the judgment delivered by the Delhi High Court was unable to consider the relevant provisions under section 10 and section 12 of the Army Act, 1950.
  2. It was argued that the centre has to consider the risk involved in the services of the Army officers especially to the women (child care issues, maternity issues and revolt areas or in any field). As stated in case Union of India v. PK Chaudhary.
  3. It was argued that the border areas have less facilities and posting of women in such areas is not sensible because of hygiene.
  4. It was argued in the Written Note by the Union of India by referring once again domestic obligations, motherhood, pregnancy and differences in the physical abilities as compare to all-male units.
  5. It was argued about the considerable benefits of pension to the women in the army who served continued even after fourteen year notice issued on 15th February 2019.

The argument advanced by the Respondent

  1. It was argued that there is nothing new about the concern regarding to privacy, women of all ages are still recruited on such post where risk factors is high, no sanitation in force headquarters, field areas, warfare areas and so on.
  2. It was argued that the Centre promotes the discriminatory policy regarding granting of PC to SSC women officers and also lower their position to that of a jawan.
  3. It was argued that the Centre claimed the presence of women establish a negative effect on the unit cohesion. Women should provided equal opportunity as men, added.
  4. It was argued that women served the nation same as the male counterparts do then why they are left in the lurch without pension and promotion.
  5. It was argued that it about 30% of the women officers is exposed to combative environment and aware about risk factor present in war zone.

RULES

  • Article 14 of the Indian Constitution (Equality before Law).
  • Article 15 (1) of the Indian Constitution (Principle of non-discrimination on the basis of sex.
  • Article 16 (1) of the Indian Constitution (Equality of opportunity for all the citizen of India in the matters of public employment).
  • Article 33 of the Indian Constitution (Power of the Parliament to modify the right conferred by this Part in their application).
  • Army Act, 1950.

FINDINGS 

On the basis of the facts and arguments advanced by petitioner and respondent, the court held the following:

  1. The option shall be given to all the women officers currently recruited as SSC officers.
  2. All the women officers serving as SSC shall be considered for granting PCs regardless whether any of them crossed fourteen years or twenty years of service.
  3. The considerable benefits shall be granted to the SSC women officers who are in service and even after as pensionable service.
  4. The specialization choice shall be available to all the women officers during they are opting for the grant in PCs alike male counterparts.
  5. The judgment delivered by the Delhi High Court is affirmed.
  6. The term “in various staff appointments only” and “on staff appointment only” mentioned under para 5 and para 6 of the order issued on 15th February 2019 respectively shall not be enforced with respected to PC of women.

REASONING

The Supreme Court headed by Justice D.Y Chandrachud challenged the issue presented by the Union government and stated that they have ingrained in stereotypical assumptions that domestic works are the responsibilities of women only and added that such order against a specific gender clearly violates their fundamental right guaranteed under Article 14 of the Indian Constitution. And not granting PC to the women officers clearly violated their Fundamental Rights provided under Article 14, 15 and 16. Justice Chandrachud said although Article 33 of the Indian Constitution permits restriction on Fundamental Right in armed forces and it is mentioned that it could be restricted up to the extent that it is essential to maintain the adequate discharge of duty and discipline. There are certain conditions laid down granting PCs to SSC women officers. Justice Chandrachud also said that “Constitution is itself feminist, as the main function off feminism is to distort social Hierarchies and so is of constitution.”

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

Indian Court has always come forth to protect the rights of women and this judgment again proven that our court stands up for the right of the women which were not granted to them. It is genuinely a progressive judgment and literally safeguards its place as a guardian of the constitution.

The fundamental rights guaranteed under Indian Constitution would granted to us if not followed by the quotes in letter and spirit. There were number of cases where the courts have extended fundamental right such as in Chairman Railway Board and others v. Chandrima Das (Mrs) and others and C.B. Muthamma v. Union of India to Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India. 

CONCLUSION

“It is not enough to proudly state that women officers are allowed to serve the nation in the Armed Forces when the true picture of their service conditions tells a different story”. Supreme Court on Indian’s Army failure to enact the judgment which allows PC for women officers. This judgment undoubtedly appreciatable and commendable but it still left us with a question whether do we the holder of right. There is a need to ask our right from other institutions.

Article 39 of the Indian Constitution empowers the state to work for securing equality for men and women and a right to proper means of livelihood. This whole issue arises from the stereotypical idea against women that they are physically weaker than men, not enough efficient to fight and are not capable to face such situations. This mindset should be needed to change because it violates firstly their rights and also break them mentally and emotionally.

SHAYARA BANO V. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS (2017) 9 SCC 1

This Case Summary is written by Krithika CJ, a student of Bishop cotton women’s Christian law college

INTRODUCTION:

On 22nd of August in 2017 the Supreme Court of India pronounced Muslim separation through triple ta-laq illegal. Via triple (talaq–e–biddat) Muslim men could separate from their spouses in a flash and without state intercession by articulating “talaq” threefold. The case had been brought under the watchful eye of the court by the applicant Shayara Bano and other women who had been separated along these lines. Diverse Muslim ladies’ gatherings had interceded to help them. On the result, the court was parted three to two. The three adjudicators in the majority regarded triple talaq invalid, however utilized diverse thinking to come to their end result: Justices Rohington Nariman and U. U. Lalit held that the 1937 Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, to the extent that it alludes to significantly increase talaq, disregarded Article 14 of the Indian constitution – the right to equality. Justice Kurian Joseph rather contended that triple talaq was not a substantial practice in Islam and was subsequently unlawful. The minority observance, held by Chief Justice Jagdish Singh Khehar and Justice Abdul Nazeer, was that however triple talaq was undesired, the courts couldn’t strike it down, and just the parliament could direct on the matter. The judgment is a milestone case in the Indian ladies’ development’s agitating for additional rights under the umbrella of personal laws. From there on 28th December, 2017 Lok Sabha passed the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Bill, 2017. On 9th August, 2018 alterations to the Bill was circled in the Rajya Sabha and on 10th August, 2018, the Chairman, Rajya Sabha announced that the Bill couldn’t be introduced because of absence of concurrence and from there on 19th September, 2018, it is said that the statute being referred to was proclaimed. Ultimately the Muslim women (protection of rights on marriage) Act, 2019 was passed by the parliament, as per this, a Muslim man is not allowed to divorce his wife abruptly by way of ‘Instant divorce’ as it has become unconstitutional and hence illegal. 

“The Triple Talaq Bill is not about politics but empowerment and justice for women. This bill is not about any specific religion and community. The bill is about humanity and justice.” — Ravishankar Prasad, Former Minister of Law and Justice of India. 


FACTS INVOLVED IN THE CASE:

Shayara Bano, spouse of Rizwan Ahmad was hitched for a period of 15 years. Her significant other articulated ‘talaq’ multiple times within the sight of two witnesses and conveyed ‘talaq-nama’ on 10/10/2015 to her. The spouse tested something very similar before the Supreme Court contending that these three practices – triple talaq, polygamy and nikah halala were illegal because of which the sacred legitimacy of such practice was called before an established seat of the apex court comprising of 5 adjudicators from various grounds. She guaranteed that these practices were violative of a few given under the Constitution of India including; 

a) Article 14 which states, “Equality before law The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.”

b) Article 15(1) which states that the state shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. 

c) Article 21 which states that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law, and 

d) Article 25 which guarantees freedom of religion. 

MATTERS IN QUESTION:

1)Regardless of whether the act of talaq-e-biddat (explicitly immediate triple talaq, a fundamental act/practise of Islam). 

2)Regardless of whether the act of triple talaq abuses any fundamental rights. 

RELIGIOUS SUBSTRATUM OF THE MATTER:

The concept of divorce has been regarded as a natural sequel to a marriage. However, divorce was not recognised by all communities in olden days. The general belief that marriage is indissoluble is no longer welcome by the 21st century. It was merely granted as a matter of necessity which hold special circumstances and aims at bringing about a sense of equality between a man and a woman. The ideals may differ from one religion to other but it has persisted in-spite of acute disagreement, in order to set a balanced approach to marital life and conjugal relations. 

Under the Muslim law, a marriage is called off either by the death of either of the spouse or by divorce. The Quran grants permission somewhat in view of some face to the traditions and part of the way to empower men to dispose of a terrible association. The Prophet gave to the woman the right of obtaining separation on reasonable grounds. The Prophet is reported to have said that if a marriage is detrimental to a woman, then it can be allowed to be broken off. 

The bone of contention in this case was about one of the modes of talaq which is ‘Talaq-e-biddat’, recognised among the Hanafis which could be affected only by the husband. The effect of irrevocability itself makes the practise sinful as observed by Islamist jurists. It was said to be introduced by Omeyyads in order to break free from the severity of the legal repercussions. In the case of Fazlur Rahman v. Aisha, the validity of this type of divorce was held questionable and argued that it goes against the Quranic precepts. Furthermore, in excess of 20 Islamic nations including Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, Iraq, even Pakistan and Bangladesh, are refreshing Sharia laws, and have forced a directive against the utilization of ‘triple talaq’ by spouses. In Turkey and Cyprus, unilateral divorce also has necessary court intercession.

In Gazula Dasaratha Rama Rao v. State of A.P. Das J, said, “Even if there was a custom which has been recognised by law … that custom must yield to a fundamental right.” However, India is a country that has held customs to be sacrosanct but only upto a limit that those do not supersede or override the effects of statutory laws. 

In the case of A. Yousuf Rawther v. Sowramma, Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer observed that, “The view that the Muslim husband enjoys an arbitrary, unilateral power to inflict divorce does not accord with Islamic injunctions … “ 

Hence, there was a decisive understanding that talaq has to be on the basis of good will and must not hold any malicious intent to outrage the dignity of a Muslim woman. 

CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONERS:

Article 14 of the Indian constitution expressly goes on to say that the state shall not deny equality to any person before the law and ensures equal protection for all within the ambit of the country’s territory. This article holds the essence of the right to equality. It not only removes discrimination but also implies that no individual shall exercise special privilege than the other. In a philosophical sense, equality is a dynamic norm. 

In this context, the practise of talaq-e-biddat, allowed a male spouse an extended right to cut the ties of a marriage, which clearly violates the basic principle of article 14 of the Indian constitution. A female spouse had no say in this particular matter and yet again it goes against the protection of all persons by Article 14. Furthermore, it infringes the right guaranteed under clause (1) of Article 15, which prohibits any kind of disparities on the basis of sexual orientation. This established an element of prejudice and unjust distinction of the female spouse in a marriage under Islamic law and made the way clearer to empower the Muslim women and change the social attitude of the community entirely. 

What is held to be bad in the Holy Quran cannot be good in Shariat and, in that sense, what is bad in theology is bad in law as well.” 

In Rukia khatun’s case, the division bench stated that the correct law of talaq as ordained by Holy Quran is that (a) Talaq must be for reasonable cause, and (b) Talaq must be preceded by an attempt of reconciliation between the husband and the wife and two arbiters. Thus, the apex court of India has disapproved the instant divorce followed in India. 

SETTLEMENT ARRIVED AT:

Justice R.F. Nariman and Justice U.U. Lalit saw that applying the trial on arbitrariness of the case within reach, plainly triple talaq is a type of talaq which is itself considered as something inventive for example it’s anything but Sunna, being a sporadic type of talaq. The Hanafi school which perceives this type of talaq, explicitly expresses that however legitimate it is corrupt in that it causes fierceness of God. Since triple talaq is moment and unalterable/irrevocable, clearly any endeavour at compromise among a couple by two referees from their families, which is vital for save conjugal tie, can’t at any point happen. It is additionally certain that this type of talaq is plainly subjective in sense that conjugal tie can be broken eccentrically and fancifully by Muslim man with no endeavour at compromise in order to save it. This type of ‘talaq’ must, accordingly, be held to be violative of key right contained under Article 14 of Constitution of India.

Justice Kurian Joseph likewise agreed the assessment of the over two Judges. He says that the section in Holy Quran identifying with talaq is very clear and unambiguous. Holy Quran has credited holiness to execution of marriage. Notwithstanding, he believes that in amazingly unavoidable circumstances, talaq is passable. Yet, an endeavour for compromise should be made and in the event that it falls flat, disavowal are Quranic fundamental strides before talaq accomplishes irrevocability. In triple talaq, this entryway is shut, thus, triple talaq is against fundamental precepts of Holy Quran and subsequently, it disregards Sharia.

Then again, Chief Justice Khehar and Justice Abdul Nazeer offered a contradicting input holding that religion involves confidence and not of rationale. It’s anything but open to court to acknowledge populist approach, over training (followed for as far back as 1400 years) which comprises indispensable piece of religion. Constitution permits supporters of each religion, to follow their convictions and strict customs. Constitution guarantees devotees, everything being equal, that their lifestyle, is ensured and would not be liable to any test, despite the fact that they may appear to others unsuitable, in this day and age and age. Constitution broadens this assurance, since confidence comprises strict cognizance of devotees. It is this strict awareness which ties adherents into independent substance. Constitution attempts to ensure and save, convictions of every one of independent substances under Article 25.

EXPOSITORY EPILOGUE:

Great amount of sanctity has been the moral foundation to the concept of marriage in Indian context. Yes, there are certain contradictory views in today’s society.  Social reforms are essential for growth and progress in any country. Even in the Hindu culture, the bond of marriage is considered to be inseparable. The husband and wife are regarded as one. The ideals of Ram and Sita from the great Indian epic – Ramayana are still followed. Community and change within a certain framework of principles and values are some of the basic tenets of a modern society. Therefore, it becomes a collective responsibility of all of us to shun undesirable social practised that have existed for centuries. Problems are not cured wholly by legal reformation but also requires some inward introspection of our own thoughts. 

Through time immemorial women have often been targeted atrociously. In this purview, the sad saga of the Muslim women was paid attention. It is the moral and legal duty of the people as well as the judiciary. Triple talaq has been termed ‘illegal’ and ‘unconstitutional’ and hence, blocks the escape routes for the accused. It sets an exemplary precedent which has similar circumstances and gives weightage to the victim’s plight. 

CONCLUSION:

It is no uncertainty that the triple talaq judgment has become a landmark judgment particularly on the part of private law in this country. It has given us different various viewpoints on the best way to manage them particularly Justice Joseph’s “socially grounded” judgment. This judgment unquestionably showed that the high court has gained from its previous slip-ups on close to home law. In spite of the way that it needed to give lucidity on sex equity and imbalance in close to home laws and how they are to be dealt with. It likewise didn’t address if “saving” triple talaq implied that it had no legitimate impact at all or three utterances implied one. Hence completely said and done, it’s anything but a move towards correspondence and has given a spine to how future individual law and social changes need to occur. This judgment likewise dealt with the minority is an entirely feasible way which is a stage toward secularism. It is trusted that this judgment will be taken in the brilliant light and will help Muslim lady to live a superior and safer life as guaranteed by the tradition that must be adhered to.

Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2019) SCC 29

This Case Summary is written by Saurabh Gupta & Yashaswini Sangania, students of Nirma University

Synopsis

The provision of adultery under section 497, Indian Penal Code saw women as men’s property has been repealed because it treats women as chattels rather than human beings. The culture in which we live has two sets of morality standards for assessing sexual behaviour: one for males and one for females, which ascribes unattainable qualities to women and restricts them to a restricted area of behaviour through the expectation of compliance.

The legal subjugation of one sex to another is immoral in and of itself, and is currently one of the greatest impediments to human progress in world; and that it should be replaced by a system of full equality, permitting neither power nor privilege on the one hand, nor handicap on the other hand, women cannot be treated as second-class citizens in today’s society with such discriminatory rules. This case comment deals with all the issues related to Adultery and its decriminalization.

Background

The constitutional validity of this provision has been challenged in 4 previous judgements.

  • YUSUF ABDUL AZIZ v. STATE OF BOMBAY

The appellant Yusuf Abdul Aziz, when charged under section 497 of IPC, challenged its constitutional validity that it violated his right to equality under article 14 and 15(1). He claimed that the provision of adultery did not make women culpable in an adulterous relationship and was discriminatory against men making them solely liable for the act. The supreme court upheld the constitutional validity of the impugned section by declaring it a special provision safeguarded under article 15(3) of the constitution which does not allow the article to prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children.

  • SOWMITHRI VISHNU v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR.

Sonwrithi vishnu approached the supreme court under article 32 of the constitution, challenging the constitutional validity of section 497 of the Indian Penal Code. It was contended that this section does not give a wife the right to prosecute her husbands or the woman they have sexual relations with, for the offence of adultery. It was further contended that the provision that prima facie seems to be a measure of positive discrimination in favor of women, was in fact based on the notion that women are mere chattels of men. The apex court upheld the validity of the provision and interpreted the definition of adultery literally, stating that it could only be committed by men and not women. Extending the ambit (if required) of the offence under section 497 was a task for the legislature and not judiciary.

  • V. REVATHI v. UNION OF INDIA 

In this case V. Revathi filed a petition under article 32 of the constitution, challenging the Section 198 Cr.P.C. She contended that whether or not the law permits a husband to prosecute his disloyal wife, the wife cannot be lawfully disabled from prosecuting her disloyal husband. the court ruled in the favor of the provision stating that it Is not discriminatory on the basis of sex, as it does not allow the wife or the husband to prosecute each other on the occurrence of such an offence. It punishes the third party i.e. a male who commits adultery and defiles the sanctity of the matrimonial bond. 

  • W. KALYANI v. STATE THROUGH INSPECTOR OF POLICE AND ANR 

The constitutionality of section 497 was not questioned in this case but it was remarked that a woman is completely immune to the charge of adultery and cannot be proceeded against for the same.

Brief Facts

Joseph Shine, a Keralite hotelier in Italy, filed a writ petition under Article 32 questioning the constitutional validity of Section 497 of IPC read with Section 198 of CrPC. He argued that this provision for adultery violated article 14, 15 and 21 and was also discriminatory on the basis of sex. 

Suicide of his close friend in Kerala due to false rape charges made by a female co-worker motivated him to file the PIL where he claimed that such a provision defiles the dignity of women by treating them as mere objects or property of men while also imposing culpability on only men for an act that was consensual.

Issues

  • Whether Section 497 of Indian Penal Code is manifestly arbitrary and discriminatory under Article 14 of the Indian constitution.
  • Whether Section 497 of Indian Penal Code encourage women to be a mere chattel violating under Article 15 of the Indian constitution.
  • Whether Section 497 of Indian Penal Code violates private realm of an individual violating Article 21 of the Indian constitution.

Arguments

AGRUMENT ADVANCED BY THE PETITIONER

  • VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF INDIAN CONSTITUTION

The learned counsel on the behalf of petitioner argued that Section 497 of IPC & Section 198(2) of CrPC deprives the women right to prosecute her husband, who had maintained sexual relationship with another unmarried women and thereby is arbitrary and fails to pass reasonable classification test laid down under Article 14 of the Indian Constitution. It discriminates on the basis of sex and violates the fundamental principle of equality and equal treatment. 

The counsel further argued that reasonable classification on the basis of sex is absurd and does not benefit any class and relied on the case of State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya, where the court held that reasonable classification under Article 14 has to be made only when absolutely necessary. Moreover, in the case of Lachhman Das v. State of Punjab, it was held that anxious and overemphasis on the doctrine of reasonable classification may lead to devoid Article 14 its own virtue.

Moreover, in the case of Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar & Ors, it was held that to pass the test of reasonable classification, the classification should have reasonable nexus with the object sought. Learned counsel in the present case argued that Section 497, IPC made classification on the basis of gender and marital status and such classification does not have reasonable nexus with the object sought, and therefore violative of Article 14 of the Indian Constitution.

  • VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 15 OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION

The counsel on the behalf of petitioner argued that in the case of Kalyani v. State of Tr. Inspector of Police and Another, it was held that the consent of women is not relevant under section 497, IPC. Thereby Article 15 of the Indian Constitution cannot disguise itself as a protective discrimination and cannot act as a cover up for offences having penal consequence and promoting oppression against women which is not maintainable under any sound law.

Therefore, the counsel submitted that the law which takes away right of one particular sex to prosecute cannot be termed under the ‘beneficial legislature’ under Article 15 (3).

  • VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 21 OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION

The learned counsel submits that women in society needs to be considered on equal footing as men and plays equal role in the development as well as in the making of society. Article 21 of the Indian Constitution guarantees right to life with dignity, whereas Indian women are suffering from discrimination from ages in silence. Similarly, section 497 of IPC permits a man to have an adulterous relationship with a women other than his wife questions right to dignity of the wife and further depletes her legal right to prosecutes her husband in court of law.

Moreover, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of K.S. Puttaswamy and another v. Union of India held right to privacy under the ambit of Art. 21 of the Indian Constitution and layed immense stress on the dignity of the individual and held dignity and freedom to be dependent and a means to achieve the other. Therefore, the counsel submitted that any kind of relationship among the individuals is a matter of privacy and violating right to privacy of the individual would violate right to life under article 21 of the Indian Constitution.

ARGUMENT ADVANCED BY THE RESPONDENT

  • VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF INDIAN CONSTITUTION

The learned counsel on the behalf of Respondent argued that Art. 14 of the Indian Constitution is general in nature and needs to be read with other provisions which are set out the ambit of fundamental rights. It was further argued that Sex is a sound and valid classification and there can be no discrimination on the basis of sex. Moreover, the legislature itself differentiates on the basis of sex by providing special provisions for women and children. Therefore, it is submitted that by the virtue of art. 14 and special provisions for women validates section 497 of the IPC.

  • VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 15 OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION

The counsel on the behalf of Respondent laid its reliance on Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. The State of Bombay, and argued that section 497, IPC needs to be read Article 15(3) which provides provisions for protection of women and children. Section 497, IPC provides such protection as adulterous women cannot be punished, not even as an abettor, under the impugned section. 

  • VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 21 OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION

The learned counsel on the behalf of Respondent rebutted the petitioner’s contention and argued that right to dignity and privacy enshrined under Art. 21 of the Indian Constitution is not absolute and is subjected to greater public interest. Further, individuals are free to have consensual sexual relationship outside the martial bond and only extra marital sexual relationships are warranted under Section 497 of the Indian Constitution. 

The Counsel further argued that the India is a land of culture, ethics and tradition, where marriage is the founding stone for all. Section 497 of IPC, preserves the sanctity of the most important institution of the Indian Society and thus submitted that right to privacy and dignity could be restricted for public interest and greater good.

Judgement

  • VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14

The court found that the impugned judgement was arbitrary and does not have reasonable classification. The court found the classification arbitrary as it gave prime importance to the husband allowing him as an aggrieved person the right to prosecute against adultery while giving absolutely no rights to women for the same. This offence is indirectly derived form the notion that women are mere property of men they are married to and any person trespassing that property without the permission of the husband is committing an offence against him. The court referred the case of Shayara Bano v. Union of India and stated that the a test of manifest arbitrariness should always be applied in such cases to check the validity of legislations and the arbitrary ones should be struck down.

Taking the case of E. P. Royappa vs State Of Tamil Nadu as a precedent It was noted that Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14

  • VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 15

The court found that the impugned provision was not a case of protective discrimination against women but an inherently discriminatory act deep rooted in patriarchy.

The court found the provision discriminatory as it further boosted the stereotype of men having control over their wives’ sexuality. It boosts the false notion that women are incapable of exercising their individual sexual freedom and can be wooed or seduced by men without their awareness. The provision treats women as passive objects which can be misappropriated and also gives them protection from being punished as abettors to the offence of adultery. The provision for protective discrimination against women in Article 15(3), as per the Government of Andhra Pradesh v. P B Vijayakumar, was made to eliminate this socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women. It was also noted from the case of Independent Thought vs. Union of India that protective discrimination was to be employed in a manner that is not entrenched in the paternalistic notions of ‘protection’ Dignity and autonomy are crucial to substantive equality and thus section 497 was found violative of Article 15(1) of the constitution.

  • VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 21

The court found section 497 violative of the sexual privacy and dignity of a women and takes away the autonomy granted to her by Article 21 of the constitution.

The provision did not make adultery an offence if committed with the husbands consent which implies that he is puppet master of his wife and hence the wife is deprived of her sexual autonomy as well as individuality. The impugned section gives the idea that even after the passage of 158 years, and big ideas of women being equal to men they are still subconsciously the chattels of their husbands who wouldn’t have an identity without them. By taking the cases of S. Puttaswamy and Anr. vs Union of India and others and Common Cause v. Union of India and ors. the court said that curtailing the sexual autonomy of women is violative of the fundamental right to dignity and equality provided under Article 21.

Critical analysis

Historically, adultery has always been seen as a severe and legitimate offence in many cultures and countries. The law on adultery is continuously developing as in the past, the woman was held accountable for the offence, however, under current legislation, the male who commits adultery was punished under section 497 of the Indian Penal Code, and the wife is not held responsible.

Criminalisation as well as decriminalisation is an importance facet of criminal law and it is important to note, how criminal law is interacting with the people and upholding the moral values that organises a society. Since, the society can’t be static, there is always a need of attention of legislature to satisfy the developing needs.

Marriage is one of the social institutions which is considered very important for the smooth functioning of the society. Adultery has been a conflicted issue since a very long time and its quite astonishing to find that the law which safeguards the holiness and sanctity of marriage from dishonesty and misrepresentation, has been decriminalised 

As observed by Justice Dipak Mishra in the case of Joseph Shine v. UOI, the law of Adultery is premised on a discriminatory principle, since one of the adultery parties is assumed to be a victim and the other to be a criminal, and thereby a violation of Article 14 of the Indian Constitution because it leads to arbitrary gender categorization. While the judgment is likely to have a wide-ranging influence on marriages, the negative consequences cannot be overlooked. The legalisation of adultery will jeopardise the institution of marriage in a society where divorce rates and incidents of marital infidelity are on the rise. Not only does it risk promoting extramarital relationships, but it also risks catalysing the breakdown of marriages, leaving children of divorced parents in the lurch.

Decriminalizing section 497, IPC has a western influence and divorce rate in western countries is 52% and rising. To prevent India from following the trend, laws and sanctions against extra-martials affairs needs to be stricter.

Moreover, instead of decriminalising adultery under Section 497 IPC, only Section 198 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, which prohibits wives from bringing adultery cases, should have been decriminalised. The section should have been gender-neutral from the start.

Conclusion

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has decriminalized 150 anti-adultery laws because they favour a husband who acts like a master of his wife. This case comment concludes that society has changed dramatically, and women are no longer considered the property of their husbands. The rule outlawing adultery, as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India at the time quoted, is arbitrary and degrades a woman’s dignity.

Secretary, Ministry Of Defence V. Babita Puniya And Ors.

This Case Summary is written by Apoorva Singh & Ananya Singh, students of Galgotias University

SYNOPSIS

Gender equality has always been a point of discussion. In this case, we talk about gender equality in the armed forces. This case discusses granting permanent commission (hereinafter PC) to female officers who were enrolled via Short Service Commission in the year 1992. The bench of the Supreme Court consisting of Justice DY Chandrachud and Ajay Rastogi gave a rebuff to the contention raised by the army for denying PC to women. They criticized the army’s assumption about the ascribed role of women and labelled them as highly stereotypical. The judgement delivered by the bench is laudable, and have become an illustration of the equal outlook of our judiciary. 

BACKGROUND

The case commences from section 12 of the Army Act, 1950 which restricted the enrolment of women in the army, except in selected branches. This leads to the Union government releasing a notification wherein women were allowed to join certain branches for five years. The period which at the initiation was 5 years, was extended to 10 years and later on to 14 years. 

FACTS OF THE CASE 

On 30th January 1992, the Centre released a notification wherein women candidates were granted Short Service Commission. They were allowed to join selected branches of the army. Women who were appointed through SSC demanded equal status as their male counterparts and thereby seek PCs in the army.

In 2003, a writ petition was instituted before Delhi High Court by practising advocate, Babita Puniya for enabling PC to women officers. Many women raised the same issue so their petition was later on attached with Babita’s petition.

In 2006, in a policy revision Centre allowed women officers to serve for a period of a maximum 14 years as SSC officers. Later, Major Leena Gaurav and Lt. Col. Seema Singh challenged the court for the issue which came previously in the same year.

In 2008, the Ministry of Defense issued a circular enabling grant of PCs to women, but only prospectively. 

In 2010, Delhi High Court assembled all the petitions and administered the centre to grant PC to SSC women officers. Army moved Supreme Court challenging this order but Supreme Court upheld the order of Delhi HC.

In 2019, Centre brought notification granting PC to women officers of eight combat support services but only prospectively. The permanent commission applied to only those females who were employed after this request. 

ISSUES

  • Whether women should be granted Permanent Commission in the Indian Army?
  • Should the guidelines given by the Government of India dated 15th February 2019 be implemented? 
  • What are the conditions governing the Women Officers in the Indian Army?

CONTENTIONS

ARGUMENTS BY APPELLANTS

Appellant i.e. the secretary and ministry of defence’s contentions were taken forward by the Union of India.

  • According to the Union of India, the Delhi High court successfully slipped up sections 10 and 12 of the Army Act, 1950. These sections clearly state that the grant of PC is at the hands of the President of India and no women can seek employment apart from in areas government may seem fit. Therefore, no mandamus can be adduced in the court.
  • Under Government Policy dated 15th February 2019, the benefit of pension is to be bestowed to those women officers who have completed fourteen years of service.
  • Strengthened by section 12 of the Army act and Article 33 of the Constitution, query concerning recruitment and grant of PC is termed as policy considerations and are governed by the executives. The scope of judicial review in command and tenure has been limited as held in the Union of India and anr. V. Lt. Col. P.K. Choudhary and Ors.
  • Union of India believes that army work is unfit for women as it carries “inherent risks” but ironically it has opposite thoughts for males.
  • They cited that women already have to deal with pregnancy, motherhood and childcare, they won’t be able to do justice with their job as a soldier.  
  •  The employment of more women officers into PC’s would disturb the organizational structure, as per the contention of the Union of India.
  • The submission note of the Union of India has stated “physiological limitations” on the employability of Women Officers which comes with the challenges of motherhood, confinement and childcare. 
  • The placement of Women Officers in border areas is not preferable because the area lacks elemental hygiene.

ARGUMENTS BY RESPONDENTS 

  • Despite there being no stay order against the judgment of the Delhi High Court, no steps were taken to grant PCs to lady officials in the army.
  • Bashing on above submissions, respondents furthered that only 4% women are employed in army whereas male holds a total of 96% employment in the army. Will this not count as prejudicial?
  • Union of India stated that the existence of women in the army will destruct unit cohesion. The respondent in return said it would not happen only if the army treats women equally.
  • Women officers have been left high and dry without any kind of pensionary privilege in comparison to their male equivalent.
  • Even though there are vacancies of officers in support services, they are not allotting to women but those are filled by Retired Male officers of colonel rank.
  • Appellant professes that woman officers are posted to those areas where the probability of conflict is almost a zilch while conversely 30% of all women officers are exposed to the warzone.
  • Despite qualifying every mandatory course as their male equivalent, they are not able to seek PCs. This biased nature lowers the status of women to that of a jawan. 
  • The army does not have a rule on which officers seeking PC imperatively allotted troops. If women officers meet qualifying criteria they must be promoted to the next rank just as their male equivalent.

FINDINGS

  • Centre asserted that it is the woman who has the domestic duties on them. This deep-seated stereotype approach of the appellant infringes Art.14 of the women.
  • Court dissented with the appellant on the hygiene and sanitization argument by stating that already 30% of women are exposed to minimal hygiene and warzone area.

REASONING

  • Justice Chandrachud detected those dominant mindsets who suffer from a deep-seated stereotype about the role of women in society. While criticizing this opinion of the appellant, Justice Chandrachud held that women should not be deprived of opportunities merely because dominant mindsets of the army have a discriminatory approach towards them. 
  • Art.33 permits parliament to restrict fundamental rights of armed forces only to the extent that it ensures the proper discharge of duty and discipline within them. However, the partitioning in giving the PC status to female officers cannot be called a proper discharge of duty. Thus, the army could not take the protection of Article 33.
  • Not granting PC to female officers is their infringement of Art.14, 15 and 16.
  • The Court held that the policy decision of the Union of India dated 25thFeburary 2019 that allows Permanent Commission to women officers in 10 streams is as per sec.12 of the Army Act, 1950.

DISPOSITION/ JUDGMENT

The Supreme Court judgment is subject to certain conditions that are listed below:-

  • All-female officers of SSC are eligible to PC putting aside the fact they have crossed 14 or 20 years of service. 
  • The statements stating “in various staff appointments only” and “on staff appointments only” in both Para 5 and 6 shall not be enforced. 
  • Female officers from now on receive privileges like pension or promotion benefits like their male equivalent.
  • Women who crossed 20 years of service and have not granted PC shall retire on pension terms.
  • Women SSC officers shall have the choice of opting for PC just as their male counterparts.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The union in submissions asserted that Art. 33 of the Indian Constitution empower Parliament to restrict fundamental rights of armed forces but the argument was rejected by Justice Chandrachud. In lieu, he said that Art. 33 are not intended to restrict someone’s fundamental right up to the time proper discharge and discipline is maintained.

While evaluating Union submissions, Justice Chandrachud inferred the judgment by reckoning the interpretation of sex, understood regarding socially constructed gender, in NALSA and Navtej Singh Johar judgments. Herewith, the court stated that traditional gender roles, such as that a woman’s primary responsibility is domestic, can be considered biased under articles 15 and 16. 

The judgment should be applauded as it has resulted in gender equality and simultaneously shattered gender stereotypes and discrimination prevailing in the dominant mindsets of the Union. But will it have any influence outside the purview of the armed forces? Judgments like Triple Talaq and Sabrimala have gained an important battleground as it involves religious personal law. While affairs on public employment like the Puniya case may carry a small weightage but it surely depicts a word that Court will always work against gender stereotypes.

CONCLUSION

India, i.e. Bharat, cannot only be formed on the shoulders of her ‘Shiva’ but also on the shoulders of her ‘Parwati’ and then only Bharat can be a ‘Shakti’:

The Indian Army holds a prestigious reputation in the eyes of the public. An equal gender ratio will enhance the reputation of the Indian army. Many countries are changing their attitude not just to promote equality, but also because they need the skills that women have. It’s been a long fight, dating back to 1992, but it finally paid off when the Supreme Court granted permanent commission status to women officers in the Indian armed forces and made them eligible for command positions, allowing them to perform all types of military roles – full combat, combat support, and combat command. This verdict will serve as a milestone in curbing the gender ratio in our Armed forces. But has this verdict cured all intricacies women face in society? We are farfetched from the real battle, but we can put our feet up as the difference has initiated. This verdict will surely boost the confidence of women to chase their dreams instead of bothering about the patriarchal society. In the end, the judgment is undoubtedly laudable but we have a long way off.