Tag Archives: Government of India

Legal Expert in National Investigation Agency [Salary Rs 1.35L]: Apply by Apr 4

About the National Investigation Agency

The National Investigation Agency (NIA) is India’s premier federal law enforcement agency tasked with combating terrorism and national security threats. Established under the NIA Act 2008 following the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, it operates under the Ministry of Home Affairs to investigate cross-border crimes, insurgency, and terror financing, boasting high conviction rates and specialized jurisdiction.

About the Job

National Investigation Agency (NIA), Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India invites applications from Legal Experts of eminence for engagement against 02 (two) posts (number may vary) purely on contract basis for a period of 01(one) year or until further orders whichever is earlier.

Eligibility

  • The candidate shall be an LLM in Public International Law with specialisation in Counter Terrorism Laws and/or Cyber Law as part of the LLM curriculum/degree.
  • Publication of a minimum 1(one research article in Scopus-indexed journals/publication of books on criminal laws/counter terrorism laws/cyber terrorism laws.
  • Desirable:
    • writing and communication skills in English and working knowledge of Computer,
    • (Doctoral degree (Ph.D.) in Public International Law, International Criminal Law, Counter-Terrorism Law, Cyber Law or related discipline,
    • Experience of engagement with international bodies such as United Nations, FATF-style regional bodies, or other multilateral law-enforcement or judicial cooperation platforms,
    • Exposure to drafting or vetting of international treaties, bilateral agreements, legal opinions, or advisory notes for Government agencies,
    • Practical experience in matters relating to terror financing, sanctions regimes, digital evidence, or cyber forensics,
    • Prior experience of working with Central Government/ Ministries / Departments, investigative agencies, prosecuting agencies, or international organizations,
    • Familiarity with comparative criminal law frameworks (U.S., U.K., EU, Canada, Australia, etc.) in the domain of terrorism and cybercrime, and
    • Background of investigation /prosecution/strong research-based academia cum research engagement / (Retired) Judicial, (Retired) Foreign services at least 07 Years.

Responsibilities

  • To study the existing/evolving laws of foreign countries dealing with terrorism.
  • To provide inputs on terrorism related laws of foreign countries to the NIA to make recommendations to the Government.
  • To study and provide inputs on best practices of foreign laws vis-à-vis Indian Laws.
  • To offer suggestions on the proposed LRs (Letter Rogatory) and MLAT (Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty)requests to make them legally sound and tenable.
  • To study the existing/evolving laws and best practices adopted by foreign countries for regulating Counter terrorism and cyberspace, to prevent exploitation of social media by adversaries and to submit reports.
  • Submission of a monthly report/Research Paper on International Conventions dealing with counter terrorism, cyberspaces and preventive measures against the exploitation of social media.
  • Submission of a monthly report/Research Paper on the possibility/adopted in our environment i.e national implementation of international conventions on counter terrorism and Cyber terrorism.
  • Drafting of Model Provisions for counter terrorism Bills.
  • Research on existing laws of the countries tackling terrorism so that take-away points can be called and
  • suggesting amendments in the existing Anti-Terrorism Law of India.
  • Legal Advice on International Laws, particularly on Counter Terrorism and Cyber terrorism matters.

Duration

Contractual Initially for 01(One) Year

The contract may be extended further depending on the assessment of performance, mutual willingness and depending on the requirement. The contract may be terminated by either side at any time by giving one month’s notice.

Timing

The consultant would follow working office hours from 09.30 AM to 06.00 PM, including half an hour lunch break in between or as may be directed by the controlling officer, during normal working hours.

Salary

The Legal Experts would be paid fixed monthly remuneration of Rs.1,35,000/- (Rupees One Lakh thirty-five thousand only) per month.

No of Position

2

Location

NIA HQ, New Delhi

Deadline

Apr 4

Application Procedure

Applicants who fulfil the prescribed eligibility criteria may submit their application expressing interest in working with the National Investigation Agency (NIA) in the format provided at Annexure I.

The application must be accompanied by self-attested copies of the following supporting documents:

  • Educational qualification certificates
  • Experience certificates in Government service, if applicable
  • PPO (Pension Payment Order), wherever applicable
  • Any other relevant supporting documents

Submission of Application

The envelope containing the application and supporting documents must be clearly superscribed as:

“APPLICATION FOR THE POST OF LEGAL EXPERTS IN THE NIA”

The completed application should be sent to:

The Deputy Inspector General (Admin)
NIA Headquarters
CGO Complex, Lodhi Road
New Delhi – 110003

Email: spadmin.nia@gov.in

CLICL HERE to download the official notification.

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SC PASSES INTERIM ORDER ALLOWING WOMEN TO APPEAR FOR NDA EXAM, SLAMS ‘GENDER DISCRIMINATION’

SC Passes Interim Order Allowing Women to Appear for NDA Exam, Slams 'Gender Discrimination'

While issuing the order, the court criticised the Army for not permitting women to take part in the NDA exam.

The present public interest petition raises the issue of violation of Articles 14, 15, 16 and 19 of the Constitution of India by denying the opportunity to eligible and willing female candidates to join the National Defence Academy.

The Supreme Court on Wednesday passed an interim order to allow women to take the admission exam to National Defence Academy (NDA), even as the Centre said women cannot claim violation of any fundamental right for being denied entry as the male cadets trained there do not have any automatic advantage in future career advancement prospects over the women whose only route to enter the Army is by recruitment through short service commission.

The result would be subject to final adjudication of the petitions. A division bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Hrishikesh Roy passed the interim order in a writ petition filed by Kush Kalra seeking permission for women candidates to appear for the NDA exam.

While issuing the order, the court criticised the Army for not permitting women to take part in the NDA exam. When the Army’s counsel submitted that it is a policy decision, the top court said that the said policy decision was based on “gender discrimination”.

The present public interest petition raises the issue of violation of Articles 14, 15, 16 and 19 of the Constitution of India by denying the opportunity to eligible and willing female candidates to join the National Defence Academy and afford them a chance to enrol, train and develop themselves in the National Defence Academy into future leaders of the Indian Armed Forces.

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UAPA- Protection from Threats or Dissent?

This Article is written by Gyan Darshan Tripathi, Shashank Shukla & Vanshita Gupta, students of Dr Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, Lucknow, UP

Introduction

“Liberty may be endangered by the abuse of liberty, but also by the abuse of power.”  – James Madison

Ever since her independence, India has seen considerable conflicts with neighbouring countries and several internal struggles owing to the presence of certain insurgent groups within- putting her national security under constant threat. And all governments throughout Indian history have tried to curb threats to national security one way or the other- ways which have often proven to be a threat to India’s own citizens rather than protecting her from security threats. One such ‘way’ was the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (hereinafter UAPA) and the succeeding amendments that were made to this Act. Detailed study of the Act itself and its usage after the enactment tells us only one story- that the UAPA, in fact, is nothing but a trojan horse- something which seems harmless at first but is ultimately malicious and threatening.

Since its very enactment, the UAPA has been invoked several times to arrest people who posed a ‘threat’ to national security. But what is crucial to notice here is that more often than not, these arrested individuals, in reality, were not terrorists- they were dissenters, minorities, and activists- thus proving that the UAPA often protects the government and not the country. And that happens at the cost of our fellow citizens.

This article analyses the UAPA in detail, right from its origin to its enactment and use. It also analyses how an Act that was meant to be a protective shield for India turned into a hostile sword against her citizens.

Origin and Evolution of UAPA

In 1962, the National Integration Council appointed a Committee on National Integration and Regionalisation which advocated for few reasonable restrictions to be imposed on the citizens to maintain the national sovereignty and integrity. Consequently, the Constitution (Sixteenth Amendment) Act, 1963 was passed which imposed certain limits on Fundamental Rights to Speech and Expression, to form Associations and Unions, and to assemble peacefully. 

In pursuance of implementing these restrictions, the UAPA bill was introduced and enacted in 1967. 

Key Provisions of UAPA

The UAPA over the years has seen many amendments which make it one of the most draconian laws of independent India:-

The 1967 Act:- The original Act gave power to the Indian government to declare organisations ‘unlawful’ if the former feels that the latter is intended to disrupt the sovereignty and integrity of India. The term ‘unlawful’ was very vaguely defined, thus giving unlimited power to the government to declare organisations as ‘unlawful’ and scrutinise their members. The only safeguard present was that the government had to give proper reasoning and set up a tribunal to determine sufficient cause for the ban.

The 2004 Amendment:- The amendment in 2004 increased the ambit of UAPA to include ‘Terrorist Acts’. Due to certain provisions, it seemed like a reinvention of the controversial POTA Act, 2001. These included a vague definition of ‘terrorist acts’ and removing the safeguards of the original Act. This meant that any organisation could be banned by the government without proper reasoning or setting up tribunals.

The 2008 Amendment:- After the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai, the amendment introduced broadened the definition of a ‘Terrorist Act’, permitted to arrest a person by “anyone from a designated authority” based on “personal belief” or “anything which may furnish evidence of commission” of a crime under UAPA. It also increased the span of police custody, restrictions on bail (if the judge the allegations against the accused are prima facie true), and incarceration without chargesheet.

The 2019 Amendment:- This amendment allowed the government to declare anyone a ‘terrorist’ merely on suspicion. It also empowered NIA officials to conduct raids and seize property anywhere in India, shifted the burden of proof on the accused rather than the prosecution, and most importantly- allowed the detention of the accused up to two years without the government having to prove the crime.

UAPA as a Weapon to Curb Dissent

Over time, UAPA is being increasingly used to arrest intellectuals, minority activists, and critics of the government. Some of the notable cases are:-

  • UAPA under Congress Regime

Even though it’s the present BJP-led government that is widely criticized for misusing UAPA (and rightly so), the previous Congress-led regimes weren’t innocent either. Apart from being responsible for introducing UAPA in 1967 (and also two of its most controversial amendments in the years 2004 and 2008), Congress didn’t shy away from misusing UAPA either.

The Congress government had arrested activists Arun Ferreira, Kobad Ghandy, and Gaur Chakraborty for allegedly leading the communication wing of the banned CPI (M) party- all of them being acquitted after years of prison because the State failed to provide evidence.  The most draconian arrest was of 127 Indian Muslims in Gujarat for allegedly having links with SIMI, an organisation that was banned by the Congress-led government after the 9/11 attacks in the USA. These individuals were acquitted after 19 long years of prison- with five of them dying during the trial.

  • UAPA in Bhima-Koregaon Case

After the BJP-led government came into power, usage of UAPA increased manifold. One such incident of mass arrests was the Bhima-Koregaon case- when the government arrested 16 individuals under UAPA- for allegedly having links with CPI (M), allegedly inciting violence in Bhima-Koregaon on January 1, 2018, and for allegedly plotting to assassinate Prime Minister Modi. All these individuals still languish in jails to date- awaiting trial and being denied bail. One such individual was Father Stan Swamy, who succumbed inside the walls of Taloja Jail- after his bail was repeatedly denied. The irony here is that bail applications of these individuals keep on getting denied because the allegations against them are as serious as plotting to kill the Prime Minister- but even after three years, the trial has not even begun against these ‘heinous conspirators’.

  • UAPA in Anti-CAA Protests and Delhi Riots

The Anti-CAA protests and the Delhi Riots are other examples of mass arrests using UAPA. Those arrested included students from Jamia and JNU, minority activists, and social activists- most of them on the allegations that they conspired to incite communal violence, which then resulted in the North-East Delhi Riots. Those arrested included Safoora Zargar- a pregnant student activist and those denied bails included Natasha Narwal- a Pinjra Tod activist who couldn’t even meet her father one last time before he died (she was only given bail afterwards to perform his last rites). At this point, any sane mind would realise that arrests under UAPA are not for seeking justice, but these arrests are for suppressing the voice of dissent.

  • UAPA against Journalists

Needless to say, when a draconian regime comes after activists and students- they won’t spare journalists either. We all know about Siddique Kappan, a journalist from Kerala who was arrested on his way to cover the rape and murder of a Dalit woman in Hathras. The charges against him included links with PFI (an extremist Islamist organisation) and the allegation that he was going to Hathras to “incite communal tension”. To date, Kappan languishes in jail. Similar cases can be seen throughout India, especially in Kashmir- where numerous journalists- the only voice of dissent left in the state- were charged under the stringent UAPA and continue to remain in jails. We all know that a democracy can only function on the shoulders of journalists who can express their opinion freely- especially when that opinion is one of dissent.

Statistics

As per Home Ministry’s data shared in Parliament earlier this year, the year 2019 has seen a 72% rise in UAPA cases as compared to 2015. As per NCRB data- together with cases pending from previous years, the number of UAPA cases in India was 5,134 in 2019.

Government data also shows that between 2016 and 2019 only 2.2% of those arrested through UAPA were convicted.

The Way Forward- What can be Done?

As the use of UAPA increases with time, and when almost all of the people arrested are critics of the government- safeguards must be placed to protect ideals of liberty and human rights in our country. And which is the one institution that is meant to protect these ideals? The judiciary.

Though the increase in usage of UAPA has coincided with the lack of concern shown by the courts, it is the need of this very minute that the judiciary steps up and take suo-moto cognizance of the malicious use of UAPA by the government to stifle all forms of dissent.

Another thing required is special UAPA courts- so that the process of deciding on bail petitions and beginning of trials can be sped up.

As for the Act itself, the government must repeal the draconian provisions of UAPA so that it can actually protect India’s biggest concern- her citizens.

Conclusion

Thus, it is crystal clear that UAPA has proved to be more of a threat than a safeguard. And let us also not assume that the intention of the governments behind bringing this Act and its subsequent amendments was to safeguard India against threats. No, the intention behind the Act was to use it as a mechanism for curbing human rights, liberty and dissent. The intention was to attack minorities, and the intention was to threaten journalists and activists. And none of the ruling parties of this country have proved otherwise.

In a free democracy, there should be no place for the misuse of a law like UAPA. And even if it is indeed misused- it should be the duty of the judiciary, the opposition, and the citizens of a democracy (especially the majority community) to stand against the government and stand with their people who are unjustly exploited by it. Sadly, over time, our democracy is failing on even these fronts- only making one wonder how long will India hold its status of a ‘free democracy’. As it was rightly said- “Liberty has never come from the government. Liberty has always come from the subjects of it. The history of liberty is a history of resistance.”  -Woodrow Wilson

https://lawmentor.in/2022/03/19/uapa-protection-from-threats-or-dissent/

The Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019: A Critical Analysis

This Article is written by Arpita Mohapatra & Sanika Kapse, students of Modern Law College, Pune

Our own information is being weaponized against us with military efficiency. Every day, billions of dollars change hands and countless decisions are made on the basis of our likes and dislikes, our friends and families, our relationships and conversations, our wishes and fears, our hopes and dreams. These scraps of data, each one harmless enough on its own, are carefully assembled, synthesised, traded and sold.” – Tim Cook

Introduction:

Data Protection Bill vis-à-vis EU’s General Data Protection Regulation

Consider Chaayos, the popular teahouse chain’s facial recognition technology at a number of its stores in Delhi and Bangalore which uses this technology to create profiles of its customers which is used to “remember” them on subsequent visits, enabling repeat orders and efficient payment. With reference to this Bill, Chaayos is the ‘data fiduciary’ and the customer is the ‘data principal’. 

Determining the objectives of any data protection legislation is always surrounded by conflicting interests of the privacy of data principal, state regulations and data commodification. The objectives of EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (hereinafter, the GDPR), are data principal centric, whereas, the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 (hereinafter, the Bill), which uses the GDPR as a template, focuses on data as a ‘national asset’. Therefore, to examine the scope of the Bill a comparative analysis with the GDPR is necessary. 

The right to be forgotten (RTBF), given in the Bill, has been made unnecessarily difficult to exercise. This right cannot be exercised by directly or indirectly requesting the data fiduciary. The data principal in this case needs to obtain an order from the Adjudicating Authority, which can exercise its discretion, based on wide considerations. This is in contrast to the Supreme Court’s decision in K.S. Puttaswamy which recognized the right to have control over personal data which also includes the right to control its existence on the internet. Similarly, the Delhi High Court and Orissa High Court have held that the RTBF is an inherent part of right to privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution. Conversely, the GDPR incorporates a more extensive right to be forgotten and imposes a requirement on the data controller to erase any data on request. 

Similarly, in case of breach of personal data, the GDPR, states that the data controller is to follow a two-step process– firstly, to inform the supervisory authority where there is a low risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons and secondly, to the data subjects in case of high risk to their rights and freedoms. Whereas, under the Bill, the data fiduciary is to inform the Authority about the data breach and the discretion is vested on such Authority to determine whether the data breach should be reported to the data principal. This at the outset is contradictory to the “fiduciary” relationship which the Bill seeks to establish. 

Further, the word ‘consent’ in the GDPR has been used liberally in favour of the data subject.  The European data protection authorities have made it clear “that if a controller chooses to rely on consent for any part of the processing, they must be prepared to respect that choice and stop that part of the processing if an individual withdraws consent.” Contrarily, the Bill consists of an entire chapter which authorises the processing of personal data without consent- by the State and the companies. The Executive is allowed to process the personal data for the provision of “any” service or benefit to the data principal or the issuance of any certification, licence or permit for “any” action or activity of the data principal or for the compliance under any law. This directly contravenes the consent provision in the Bill, which mandates informing the data principal of the “purpose” for which their data is to be processed. Evidently, sweeping powers rest with the government to control citizen’s personal data without consent. The Bill also allows processing of personal data, necessary for purposes related to employment, without the consent of the data principal. The employer with this power can retrieve and process data available on the employees’ computers and mobiles. Another proposed ‘reasonable purpose’ exemption relates to “mergers and acquisitions”.  During the transactional stage of any merger or acquisition, dozens of lawyers, financial advisors, and other organizations are given access to the data stored by the companies involved in the transaction. If mergers and acquisition proceedings are treated as a blanket exemption to the requirement of consent for processing, this could act against the privacy-by-design structure of the proposed law.

Defective definitions in the Bill 

The Bill makes a deceptive distinction between ‘personal data’ and ‘sensitive personal data’ which is absurd as personal data is also dangerously vulnerable to profiling. For example, online identifiers (like devices, applications, IP addresses, cookie identifiers, etc.) can leave traces which, when combined with unique identifiers or other information received by servers and can be used to create profiles of data subjects.  

The requisites of “consent” in the Bill are watered down by the chapter on exemptions in processing of personal data and the chapter on processing of personal data without consent, which gives autonomy to the companies and the government to an extent where it negates the whole purpose of the Bill to protect personal data. 

It is pertinent to note that the distinction between ‘processing’ and ‘profiling’ under the Bill is not watertight, and that the term ‘processing’ covers a broad range of activities which may inevitably lead to profiling. The Bill not only allows ‘manual processing’ of data by the small entities which will leave the data even more prone to profiling, it also attempts to put a blanket ban on accountability of data fiduciaries and puts a rider on the rights of data principals. 

Under the Bill, the Central government can obtain anonymized personal data and non-personal data for the delivery of services and policy formulation. Such anonymized personal data can nonetheless be de-anonymised; for example, an anonymised Netflix dataset of film ratings was de-anonymised by comparing the ratings with public scores on the IMDb film website in 2014. Such de-anonymisation of personal data by the government can lead to its arbitrary use.

Arbitrary control of government in every sphere of data regulation regime

Every social media intermediary which is notified as a ‘significant data fiduciary’ is to enable the users to voluntarily verify their accounts in such manner as may be prescribed by the Central government. This power given to the State is evident of its arbitrary interference in a place where this role should unquestionably be exercised by the significant data fiduciaries. Additionally, the provisions like data protection impact assessment, maintenance of report, auditing of policies and conduct of processing etc., have limited applicability only to significant data fiduciaries. The data fiduciaries that do not come under the ambit of significant data fiduciaries can violate the objectives of the Bill if left unchecked.

The Bill provides for exemptions to the Central government to exempt any governmental agency to process personal data in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State or to preserve public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to sovereignty and integrity of India. The terms used in these sections are vague and autocratic and warrant the violation of privacy by the government. Further, the establishment of a Data Protection Authority (DPAI), which will be at the helm of affairs for the implementation of the Bill, is marred with prejudice. The selection committee for the constitution of DPAI will be comprised of Cabinet Secretary as the chairperson, Secretary, Department of Legal Affairs, and Secretary, Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology. The committee lacks legal and subject experts when compared to the former draft Bill of 2018. Therefore, the Data Protection Authority will be executive-oriented rather than being an independent regulator.

Impact of Data Localisation 

According to the Bill, all sensitive and critical personal data must be stored in servers located in India. Sensitive data may be processed outside the country but must be brought back to India for storage. Critical data cannot be taken out of the country at all. There are no restrictions for general data. Digital companies currently store and process their data wherever is economically most efficient. This locational divide, proposed by the Bill, would impose additional costs on digital companies, leading to subeconomic storage and processing capacities, and might result in “splinternet” or the fragmentation of global digital supply chains. The impact of data localisation on protection of personal data of users is contingent upon the robust infrastructural and technical capacity to protect such data within the borders. Unless these conditions are fulfilled, storage of personal data within or outside the country would make no difference for the data principal, who in either case will be exposed to risk of data breach.

Conclusion  

 The Bill provides a mere skeleton, the intricacies of which will take shape only after the constitution and working of the Data Protection Authority begins. This Bill uses the term ‘data fiduciary’ as against ‘data controller’ to emphasise on ‘duty of care’ on the part of the data fiduciary to lawfully process personal data. This ‘duty of care’ cannot be reasonably exercised by the data fiduciaries towards the data principals, if they are constantly under the radar of the government. The data principal is at the losing end, in either case of control over data by the government or data fiduciaries. Also, there is hue and cry over the Information Technology (Guidelines for Intermediaries and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 (IT Rules) which brings social media platforms under the ambit of government supervision. These regulations mandate the social media platforms to give details of the origin of messages on demand by the government. Coupled with the new IT Rules, the Personal Data Protection Bill will further increase surveillance over significant data fiduciaries which are mostly social media intermediaries, making this framework a tool to build an Orwellian State.  

S.R. BOMMAI v. UNION OF INDIA 1994 (3) SCC 1, AIR 2017 SC 2734

This Case Summary is written by Ankush Talwar & Kamaksshee Khajuria, students of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar National Law University,  Sonepat, Haryana

SYNOPSIS

S.R. Bommai v. Union of India’ is a historical landmark judgment given by the Supreme Court, which talks about the Presidential Proclamation under Article 356 of the Constitution of India. It acts as a guide for all the issues arising out of the Centre-state relations and misuse of Article 356. Under this Article, ‘the Central government can take control over a State government, in a situation wherein the State legislative machinery cannot function in accordance with the Constitutional provisions and that’s why the matters pertaining to this Article may involve controversy.’ So, to restrict such unconstitutional removal of the State governments by the Centre, the court firmly held that the General Assembly will have the authority to decide the imposition of a valid proclamation and not the Central government.

BACKGROUND 

This case mainly focuses upon Article 356 of the Indian Constitution, which deals with the emergency provision for imposing Presidential Proclamation upon a State. However, this Article was regarded as a “dead letter” of the Constitution by Dr B.R. Ambedkar due to its misuse as a political tool. Under this Article, the elected state government is dismissed and the Governor of the state, who is a functionary of the federal government, directly becomes in charge of the overall state’s administration. But this power was being repeatedly misused by the Centre to dismiss the state governments of opposite political parties, even without any genuine reasons, which violated the federal character of the Indian political system and the doctrine of popular sovereignty. Thus, to stop this unconstitutional removal of the state governments and to solve the scuffle between the Centre and the States, this judgment was passed.

FACTS OF THE CASE

S.R. Bommai was the 11th Chief Minister of Karnataka, who was representing the Janata Dal Government during the year 1989. On 21st April, his government was dissolved due to the lack of majority support and the President’s Rule was imposed under Article 356(1) of the Constitution. Bommai recommended the Governor to summon the Assembly to conduct a floor test and review the party’s majority, but his idea was rejected and after the approval of the Parliament under Article 356(3), his government was finally dismissed. A writ petition was filed by Bommai in the Karnataka High Court challenging the validity of the Presidential Proclamation, but his petition was dismissed stating that “under Article 356(1), the extent of judicial review is limited and the President’s satisfaction is a valid prerequisite for a legitimate proclamation.” Unsatisfied with the High Court’s decision, Bommai then appealed in the Supreme Court of India stating that the dismissal of his government was merely a ‘political act’ and the imposition of the President’s rule was mala fide, as there were no genuine reasons. Moreover, neither a chance was given to him to prove his party’s majority nor the facts were disclosed by the Central Government upon which the satisfaction was derived, as a part of their duty under Article 74(2). Similar kinds of proclamations were also made in the states like Meghalaya, Nagaland, etc, and thus all these cases were then collectively heard by the Supreme Court to stop the further abuse of Article 356.

PERTINENT ISSUES 

Some important issues raised in the instant case were:- 

  1. What is the Constitutional validity of Presidential Proclamation under Article 356 of the Indian Constitution?
  2. Whether the president has unfettered powers under Article 356(1)?
  3. Whether the imposition of the President’s rule is challengeable and amenable to judicial review? If yes, then to what extent?  
  4. What does the expression in Article 356(1) stating that “a situation has arisen wherein the state legislative functions cannot be in cooperation with constitutional provisions” mean?

CONTENTIONS 

Various Contentions made by both the Petitioner and Respondents are as follows:- 

PETITIONER

  1. The major contention of the petitioner was that he was not given a single chance to prove his party’s majority. Moreover, neither a floor test was conducted nor the Assembly was summoned even after the suggestions had been made to the Governor for the same.
  2. Further, it was contended that the imposition of the President’s Rule was completely mala fide and it is solely a political act since the mere fact of disturbance, torching and looting in the area is no ground for enforcing presidential proclamation, citing that the party is incompetent and must be dissolved. The true motive behind such imposition was to consolidate the power with the centre and put the representatives of the state in a socially unenforceable and inequitable position.
  3. Petitioner also contended that no material facts were presented upon which the president had derived the satisfaction to impose the emergency and dismiss the government. Under Article 74(2), it is the duty of the Union government to reveal all the material facts to both the State’s legislative members as well as the Court on behalf of which such proclamation was imposed and such a duty shouldn’t be ignored.
  4. Lastly, the petitioner made the contention that whether a president can dismiss a state legislature without the approval of both the Houses of the Parliament, and it was also contended that since Secularism is a basic feature of the Constitution, so whether a state government can be dissolved if it is found guilty for administering non-secular acts?

RESPONDENT

  1. The counsel of respondents contended that there is a distinction between the extent and nature of judicial review in constitutional law and administrative law. In administrative law, the court may expand its jurisdiction w.r.t the issues regarding the legislative powers of a governmental body but it doesn’t constitute the same authority in the field of constitutional law. The court can merely declare the actions as an abuse of discretion i.e., ultra vires. It was also contested that the courts don’t have the authority to decide the validity of the conditions for imposing a presidential proclamation. 
  2. Further, it was argued that a Presidential Proclamation would be issued by the President as per Article 356 (1) with the advice of the cabinet ministers as stated in Article 74 (1), but an inquiry into the question regarding whether or not if any advice is given to the President by the cabinet and the judicial review of the reasons on behalf of which the proclamation is made, is strictly ‘prohibited’ as per Clause 2 of the said Article.
  3. Respondents also contended that when the acts of the State Government are non-secular, then it can be dissolved under the contention of Secularism.

RATIO DECIDENDI

The Supreme Court on the basis of appropriate facts, findings and reasons gave the following judgement:- 

  • Interpretation of Article 356 and Judicial Review – It was held that under Article 356 (1), the President’s power to impose emergency is subject to judicial review, but to the extent of scrutinizing, whether the conditions relating to the issuance of the rule have been fulfilled or not. It was also reiterated that a president cannot dissolve a Legislative Assembly until his proclamation is approved by both the houses of the Parliament under Article 356 (3). However, he can adjourn the assembly under Article 356 (1)(c). It was also evaluated that the courts can reinstate the dissolved assembly (status quo) by overruling the proclamation as done in the case of “State of  Rajasthan v. Union of India, AIR 1977”. Justice Sawant and Justice Kuldip Singh interpreted that the use of Article 356 should be the last resort, and it should be imposed only when a state’s governance is unable to be carried out in conformity with the Constitutional provisions. The Jury also relied upon the reports of the Sarkaria Commission for stating different situations, where a President’s rule will be considered justifiable, like in case of failure of state machinery, political crisis, etc. It was also held that if a state government loses its majority or resigns, then the Governor cannot advise the President for imposing President’s rule until adequate measures had been taken to establish a substitute Government. 
  • Concept of Secularism and Federalism – The court observed that Secularism is an essential feature of the Indian Constitution and thus, if a state government administers any kind of unsecular policies or acts in opposition to the Constitution, then it may subject to a proclamation under Article 356. This case also talked about the concept of Federalism in contrast to the Presidential Proclamation, which had conflicting views. Justice Reddy held that “the states are not the projections of Centre and Centre doesn’t possess any power to interfere in State’s machinery unless it is critical”, while Justice Verma, Justice Ahmadi and Justice Dayal were of the view that “it is a part of basic structure of the constitution and that the politics cannot be mixed with religion by political parties.” However, despite the conflicting views, both secularism and federalism were unanimously accepted as the basic features of the Indian Constitution and nobody has the right to violate them. 

Therefore, the Court decreed in favour of the plaintiff by overruling the judgment of the Karnataka High Court and restored the dismissed state government of Janata Dal Party led by S.R. Bommai in Karnataka. Also, similar proclamations imposed in the states like Nagaland and Meghalaya were declared unconstitutional. In addition to this, the Court also gave proper directives w.r.t such proclamations being issued under Article 356 in future.

SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPACT

This landmark verdict had a huge impact on centre-state relations and thus, carries a great significance in Indian politics as it restored the federal character by stopping the arbitrary removal of State governments by the Centre to achieve political gains. It preserved the constitutional sanctity of the state government by limiting the use of Article 356. Although no question of constitutional amendment arose in this case, still the basic structure doctrine was implemented here. The judgment also ruled that a party’s majority will only be determined by a floor test and the approval by both the Houses of Parliament must be there for a valid proclamation, otherwise the dismissed government may be reinstated. The very first impact of this verdict can be seen during the year 1999 when the Vajpayee government was forced to reinstate the government it dissolved. It was also clarified that the Presidential Proclamation is subject to judicial review and even the policies of a state government which are administered against the basic structure of the Constitution, could be a valid ground for the imposition of President’s Rule under Article 356. So, it can be seen that the significance and impact of the S.R. Bommai Case have great relevance in India’s political history.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS 

This Case mainly deals with Article 356 which is an essential provision of the Indian Constitution as it functions to maintain the federal structure of the country and that is why its usage has increased over time. Since 2016, the Presidential rule has been imposed around 115 times in India and during the year 1991-1992 alone, it was imposed 9 times which was the highest till date. Thus, we can see that Article 356 was being used as a political tool, however after the passing of this judgment and formation of the ‘Sarkaria Commission’, its misuse has steadily declined. Although, there is a positive impact but the alarming concern was that even though the frequency has reduced yet the power was highly misused as only around 60 proclamations can be justified, while the remaining are controversial, which depicts that in more than a half of the cases, the power has been grossly misused. So with this alarming discovery, a very important question that arose was “whether this Article should be omitted or not?”, but keeping in view the significance of this Article in maintaining the balance of power between the Centre and the States, deleting it will not be a wise choice as it may lead to a negative impact upon the Centre-State relationship. So instead of deleting it, proper amendments should be made to avoid its misuse in future.    

Now when we look upon the interpretation of Judicial review in the instant case, we can see that even when it isn’t possible to establish a uniform law across all the cases, the judgment of this case established that the Judiciary is the ultimate interpreter and guardian of the Indian Constitution by any necessary means. It was the first time in case of “State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, AIR 1977”, where the notion of judicial review regarding the satisfaction of the President to impose president’s rule came before the Court even after the presence of bar under Article 74 (2) and Article 356 (5), which states that “the Presidential Satisfaction as mentioned in Clause 1 shall be final and conclusive and cannot be challenged in any court on any ground.” However, by omitting the said clause through the 44th Amendment Act, 1978 this exclusion was removed and after the Bommai case, it was concluded that Article 356 doesn’t enjoy transactional immunity. A similar kind of event took place in the case of “C.R. Das v. Union of India, AIR 1999”, where the Governor issued a report mentioning the breakdown of the constitutional machinery in the state, which however was refused by the president stating that ‘bad governance doesn’t amount to breakdown’.

In another case of “Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India, AIR 2005”, the court said that “the emergency Proclamation cannot be imposed upon the will of Governor, rather it must be made on real and cogent grounds.” However, the interim stay order was not issued and the fresh elections were organised in the above case, which signifies that the principles laid down by the Bommai case were not followed. Though, there were also cases like “Union of India v. Harish Chandra Singh Rawat, AIR 2016”, where the court in order to protect the democratic and federal spirit of the constitution went a step further to execute the floor test by removing the presidential rule for 2 hours. So, preventing the misuse of Article 356 was not always as simple and had its ups and downs.

Therefore, in short, we can say that the court has taken a bold step by making an exemplary effort to restrict the misuse of Article 356 by creating a distinction between the powers of the Centre to interfere in the governance of the State legislature.

CONCLUSION 

S.R. Bommai v. Union of India is a landmark case which not only deals with the basic structure of the Constitution but also strengthens the federal structure of Indian Politics by restricting the interference of the Centre in the State’s administration. Its main objective was to restrain the misuse of Article 356 by ending the practice of arbitrary removal of state governments and it also specified the scope of Judicial review even under the Presidential Proclamation. Besides this, the judgment also highlighted the concept of secularism and federalism as an important part of the basic structure of the constitution. So, it has undoubtedly played an important role in the development of constitutional law and due to its complex nature and conflicting opinions of the judges, it has gained much significance in history and even today. Therefore, it can be concluded that Article 356 is an essential provision of the Constitution of India.